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Hazardous Chemical Reporting Under EPCRA:
The Seventh Circuit Eliminates the "Better Late
Than Never" Excuse from Citizen Suits
I. INTRODUCrION

In 1986, Congress passed into law the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act ("SARA").' Under Title III of SARA, Congress
enacted an immense environmental regulatory program called the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA"
or the "Act").2 EPCRA's purpose was to fill an informational void
concerning the use of toxic and hazardous chemicals and to improve
emergency response capabilities in the event of an accidental release of
such chemicals that might endanger the general public.3
Ten years later, in July of 1996, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals examined one of EPCRA's most important, yet still widely
unfamiliar,4 provisions. This provision allows for legal remedies by
private citizens-also known as citizen suits.5 In Citizensfor a Better
Environment v. Steel Co.,6 a Seventh Circuit panel examined for the
first time EPCRA's citizen suit provision which authorizes private
citizens to pursue civil remedies against those in violation of the Act.'
The court addressed whether EPCRA permits private citizen plaintiffs
to sue violators based on wholly past violations-violations that no
longer exist by the time the civil action is brought.8 Overturning the
1. Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 101-213, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
2. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA") §§ 300-330,
42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994). Although originally incorporated into SARA,
EPCRA was introduced as a separate bill and now exists as a free-standing law. See A. L.
Laboratories, Inc. v. EPA, 826 F.2d 1123, 1124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
3. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-962 (1986) [hereinafter House Conference Report],
discussed more fully infra note 308.
4. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
5. See EPCRA § 326, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1994). The "citizen suit" is a remedy
designed to supplement governmental regulatory enforcement by enlisting the aid of
ordinary citizens as "private attorneys general." See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 1077 (2d ed. 1996); see also
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737-38 (1972) (stating that a citizen acts as a
"private attorney general" when he or she "seek[s] judicial review of agency action").
6. 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S.CL 1079 (Feb. 24, 1997).
7. See id. at 1238. The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Eschbach, Evans, and
Rovner. See id.
8. See id. at 1242. The Seventh Circuit phrased the issue before it as "whether
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only interpretation existing at the time concerning EPCRA's citizen suit
provision, the Seventh Circuit held that EPCRA permits private
citizens to recover for violations of its reporting requirements, even
when those violations are purely historical. 9
Just one year earlier, however, in Atlantic States Legal Foundation
v. United Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc.,'0 the Sixth Circuit held
just the opposite. The Sixth Circuit concluded that EPCRA's citizen
suit provision prohibits private citizens from recovering for historical
violations of the Act's reporting requirements." Thus, despite being
just the second occasion that a federal appeals court has ruled on the
allowance of citizen suits for historical violations under EPCRA,' 2 the
Seventh Circuit's holding in Citizens for a Better Environment
contradicted the only other existing ruling. 13 As a result, a conflict has
emerged over the proper construction of EPCRA's citizen suit
provision, leaving considerable doubt as to which is the correct
interpretation. Such doubt shall be short-lived, however, due to the
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in order to bring this citizen suit
conflict to resolution.4
This Comment will address the dynamics of this conflict and will
evaluate the enforcement authority granted to private citizens under
EPCRA. The Comment will begin with a statutory overview of
EPCRA,' 5 focusing on the Act's goals and objectives.' 6 This
overview will also examine the Act's critical provisions, dividing the
examination among the Act's reporting 7 and enforcement' 8
provisions. The Comment will then review the origins of the citizen
citizens may seek penalties against EPCRA violators who [comply with the Act's
requirements] after the statutory deadline, after receiving notice of intent to sue, but
before a complaint may be filed in the district court." Id.
9. See id. at 1244-45. Throughout this Comment, the term "historical violations"
will be used to describe violations of regulatory laws which the alleged violator has
cured or rectified by the time a civil suit is filed.
10. 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied en banc, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 30933
(6th Cir. Oct. 16, 1995).
11. See id. at 475. The Sixth Circuit concluded that "EPCRA does not allow citizen
suits for past violations that have been cured by the date the action commences." Id.
12. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1245.
13. See supra text accompanying note 11; Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1242
n. 1.
14. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (Feb. 24, 1997)
(granting certiorari).
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See infra Part I.A. 1.
17. See infra Part II.A.2.
18. See infra Part II.A.3.
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suit as a means of environmental regulatory enforcement, 9 exploring
how the United States Supreme Court has treated such legislation."0
This background will provide the perspective for a discussion of
citizen suits under EPCRA2 and the conflicting interpretations of the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits. 22 After a detailed analysis of this
conflict, 23 the Comment will endorse the Seventh Circuit's broader
interpretation as the more rational and effective approach. 24 The
Comment will propose that permitting citizen suits for historical
violations of EPCRA will produce more meaningful enforcement
results and will undoubtedly lead to benefits above and beyond the
Act's stated objectives.25
II.BACKGROUND

The mid-1980's saw increased attention on the presence and use of
toxic chemicals in or near populated communities and residential
developments2 6 This attention was the direct result of numerous
catastrophes involving hazardous chemicals, the most significant being
the 1984 Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, India, which killed over
2,500 people and injured countless others.2 7 The United States alone
experienced almost 7,000 accidents involving chemicals in the five
years preceding the enactment of EPCRA.*
19. See infra Part II.B. 1.
20. See infra Part II.B.2.
21. See infra Part III.A. 1.
22. See infra Parts III.A.2-3.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. See infra Part V.
26. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1238 (7th Cir. 1996),
cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (Feb. 24, 1997). See also Jayne S.A. Pritchard,
Comment, A Closer Look at Title III of SARA: Emergency Planning and Community
Right-To-Know Act of 1986, 6 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 203-06 (1988).
27. See PERCIVAL Er AL, supra note 5, at 647; Pritchard, supra note 26, at 203-04; see
also Robert W. Shavelson, EPCRA, Citizen Suits and the Sixth Circuit's Assault of the
Public's Right-To-Know, 2 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 29 (Fall 1995) (crediting the tragic
release of cyanide gas from the Union Carbide plant in India with prompting EPCRA's
enactment); David J. Abell, Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know: The
Toxics Release Inventory, 47 SMU. L. REV. 581 n.3 (1994) (stating that Congress
enacted EPCRA in response to the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, India) (citing
Pritchard, supra note 26, at 202-04).
28. See Draft EPA Study Counts 6,900 Releases of Acutely Toxic Chemicals in Five
Years, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 1022 (Oct. 11, 1985); 135 CONG. REC. S4152,
S4163 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1989) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). One year after Bhopal,
another release of toxic chemicals from a Union Carbide Plant occurred in Institute, West
Virginia. The leak injured 150 people, and a subsequent investigation revealed
numerous deficiencies in the emergency plans and preparations for such an incident. See
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A high level of uncertainty regarding the handling, use, and release
of toxic chemicals by facilities in the United States prompted
legislators to devise a scheme for the collection, maintenance, and
dissemination of such information vital for public safety. 9 In an
attempt to quell fears of future disasters of Bhopal's magnitude,
Congress passed EPCRA as a means of filling informational voids
about the presence of such chemicals, and improving emergency
response capabilities in the event that such a crisis occurs in the United
States.30
A. A Statutory Overview of EPCRA
Although implemented over ten years ago, EPCRA remains one of
the lesser-known environmental statutes.31 Even many industrial
corporations that are subject to its reporting requirements remain
unaware of EPCRA's existence.32 Despite evidence of its obscurity,
EPCRA looms as one of the most significant and far-reaching
environmental statutes ever implemented. 3 In fact, EPCRA quite
possibly comprises
the largest regulatory scheme ever enacted by
34
Congress.

Eric M. Falkenberry, The Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act: A
Tool For Toxic Release Reduction in the 90's, 3 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1995) (citing
Casey Bukro, Carbide Plant Leaks, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 12, 1985, § 1, at 1).
29. See Abell, supra note 27, at 581 n.3 (citing Carbide May Speed Controls, RightTo-Know Emergency Response Rules, 1 Toxics L. REP. (BNA) No. 16, at 635 (Aug. 16,
1985)); Bhopal Update: India, U.S. Still Grapple With Effects, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING
NEWS, Jan 21, 1985, at 4; see also Pritchard, supra note 27, at 204-05, noting that:
[A]s a result of these concerns, pressure was brought to bear on federal
agencies thought to have authority over such accidental releases of chemicals
at industrial facilities. However no agency had clear authority over releases
such as those which occurred in Bhopal and West Virginia .... A nationwide
need existed for emergency planning to help prevent accidental releases, not
merely plan for cleanup once a release occurs, and to facilitate timely and
effective emergency response.
Id.
30. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1238 (7th Cir. 1996),
cert granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (Feb. 24, 1997).
3 1. See id. The Citizens for a Better Environment court estimated that only about 20
federal cases had arisen under EPCRA since its enactment in 1986. See id.
32. See id. (citing General Accounting Office, Report to Congress, Toxic
Chemicals-EPA's Toxic Release Inventory Is Useful But Can Be Improved (June
1991)).
33. See Shavelson, supra note 26, at 29.
34. See Abell, supra note 27, at 581 (citing Enforcement: EPCRA Business Potential
Substantialfor Defense Attorneys, EPA Official Says, 16 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) No.
25, at 1122 (Sept. 18, 1992)).
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Simply put, EPCRA is an informational statute.35 A unique element
of EPCRA is its purpose of protecting public health and safety through
information disclosure, rather than through the more traditional
"command-and-control" or "end-of-pipe" methods of environmental
regulation.' Generally, EPCRA has been characterized as addressing
response rather than prevention.37 However, while passing the Act in
order to ensure effective local response in the event of a chemical
emergency, Congress included disclosure requirements that emphasize
the free flow of information concerning toxic chemicals?3 So far, this
information has proven surprisingly useful and has led to some
unexpected results. 39 Once compiled and made available pursuant to
the Act's guidelines, EPCRA-generated information has served as a
"benchmark" and "catalyst" for other environmental regulatory laws
and new pollution prevention programs.' °
1. EPCRA's Goals and Objectives
EPCRA has two principal objectives: "emergency planning" and the
community's "right to know."'" First, EPCRA's "emergency
planning" goals are designed to facilitate emergency plans for local
response in the event of a release42 of hazardous chemicals into the
environment, thereby endangering the community.43 Second,
EPCRA's "right to know" component gives the general public access
to vital information concerning the presence and use of hazardous

35. See Shavelson, supra note 26, at 30.
36. See id. Such other methods of regulation look to set limits on the amounts of
pollution allowed to be discharged, whereas EPCRA "merely requires facilities to report
the amounts and types of chemicals stored at or released from their plants." Id.
37. See Steven J. Christiansen and Stephen H. Urquhart, The Emergency Planning and
Community Right To Know Act of 1986: Analysis and Update, 6 B.Y.U. J.PUB. L. 235,
236 (1992).
38. See EPCRA §§ 304, 311-313, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11004, 11021-11023 (1994).
39. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1238-39 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 1079 (Feb. 24, 1997). It has been noted that "Congress
anticipated that the availability of information about ... toxic chemicals would enable
the public to put substantial pressure on companies to reduce emissions. [EPCRAJ
appears to be having precisely this impact." PERCIVAL ET AL, supra note 5, at 649.
40. See Christiansen and Urquhart, supra note 37, at 246, 251.
41. See EPCRA §§ 304, 311-313.
42. EPCRA defines the term "release" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing
into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers
and other closed receptacles) of any hazardous chemical, extremely hazardous substance,
or toxic chemical." EPCRA § 329(8), 42 U.S.C. § 11049(8) (1994).
43. See Christiansen and Urquhart, supra note 37, at 236.
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substances' within the community. 45
To facilitate "emergency planning," Congress designed EPCRA to
provide a "blueprint" for effective local response in the event of a
serious toxic emergency.4 EPCRA calls for the establishment of
emergency planning bodies and the development of local emergency
response plans. 47 Further, each state is required to establish a State
Emergency Response Commission ("SERC") comprised of
representatives appointed by the governor of each state.4 The SERC,
in turn, must appoint local emergency planning committees ("LEPCs")
to formulate response plans at district levels. 49 The LEPCs are to be
comprised of various representatives from the public and private
sectors. 50 Each LEPC is responsible for the collection and
dissemination of data on hazardous chemicals and the establishment of
safety precautions and procedures (called comprehensive emergency
response plans) to follow in the event of an emergency.51
44. The term hazardous substances will be used throughout this Comment to refer to
chemicals that present varying degrees of danger to humans when exposed. EPCRA's
right-to-know provisions differ according to whether such substances are classified as
"hazardous," "extremely hazardous," or "toxic." The term "hazardous chemical," defined
in United States Code section 11021(e), is given the same meaning that it is given in
Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c) (1996), with
exceptions provided for certain food, cosmetic, agricultural, and medical substances.
See EPCRA § 311(e), 42 U.S.C. § 11021(e) (1994). Section 11002(a) of the United
States Code defines the term "extremely hazardous substance" as any substance that has
been listed as such by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") or which requires
notification under section 103(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (1994).
See EPCRA § 302(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11002(a). The term "listed toxic chemical" means any
chemical so designated by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works.
See EPCRA § 313(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11023(c).
45. See Abell, supra note 27, at 586.
46. See id. at 583.
47. EPCRA §§ 301,303, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001, 11003 (1994).
48. See id. § 301(a).
49. See id. § 301(b).
50. See id. § 301(c). Personnel from the following fourteen groups are required to be
represented: elected State and local officials; law enforcement, firefighting, first aid,
civil defense, public health, local hospital, environmental, and transportation
personnel; members of the broadcast and print media; community groups; and owners
and operators of facilities liable for compliance under EPCRA. See id.
51. See EPCRA § 303, 42 U.S.C. § 11003 (1994). As part of each comprehensive
emergency response plan, the Act requires LIPC's to identify the facilities within their
district that are subject to the Act's reporting requirements and any others which present
a risk due to their nature or proximity. See id. § 303(c)(1). Each plan must set forth
methods and procedures, including evacuation plans, to follow in the event of a
hazardous chemical release, and must provide "procedures providing reliable, effective,
and timely notification by the facility . . . that a release has occurred." See id. § 303
(c)(2)-(9).
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In order to protect the community's "right to know," EPCRA
stimulates the flow of information to the general public about the use
of chemicals within the community.5 2 EPCRA establishes an elaborate
reporting scheme for businesses and industries that handle toxic or
otherwise hazardous chemicals.- The reporting scheme requires each
subject facility to file a panoply of forms with its respective SERC,
LEPC, and fire department ("Local Committees"), revealing precise
data on the identity, location, and quantity of any hazardous chemicals
being handled on site.' As a result of these reporting provisions,
EPCRA's "right-to-know" component produces mind-boggling
volumes of data used to build public concern and political consensus
concerning regulation of such toxic substances. 55
2. EPCRA's Reporting Provisions
Both of EPCRA's statutory objectives, "emergency planning" and
the "right-to-know," are embodied within its scheme of reporting
requirements.56 The goal of improved emergency planning is
52. See House Conference Report, supra note 3, discussed more fully infra note 308.
53. EPCRA's most pertinent reporting requirements provide:
Sec. 11021. Material safety data sheets.
(a) Basic requirement. (1) Submission of MSDS or list. The owner or
operator of any facility which is required to prepare or have available a
material safety data sheet for a hazardous chemical under [OSHA and its
regulations] shall submit a material safety data sheet for each such chemical,
or a list of such chemicals . . . to each of the following: (A) The appropriate
local emergency planning committee (B) The State emergency response
commission (C) The fire department with jurisdiction over the facility.
Sec. 11022. Emergency and hazardous chemical inventory forms.
(a) Basic Requirement. (1) The owner or operator of any facility which is
required to prepare or have available a material safety data sheet for a hazardous
chemical under [OSHA and its regulations] shall prepare and submit an
emergency and hazardous chemical inventory form . . . (2) . . . on or before

March 1, 1988 and annually thereafter on March 1 . .. [containing data for]..
* the preceding calendar year.
Sec. 11023. Toxic chemical release forms.
(a) Basic Requirement. (1) The owner or operator of a facility subject to the
requirements of this section shall complete a toxic chemical release form ...
for each toxic chemical listed under subsection (c) of this section that was
manufactured, processed, or otherwise used in quantities exceeding the toxic
chemical threshold quantity . . . during the preceding calendar year at such
facility. Such form shall be submitted . . . on or before July 1, 1988, and
annually thereafter on July 1 and shall contain data reflecting releases during
the preceding calendar year.
EPCRA §§ 321-323, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021-11023 (1994).
54. See EPCRA §§ 311-312, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021-11022 (1994).
55. See Christiansen and Urquhart, supra note 37, at 236.
56. EPCRA §§ 304, 311-313, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11004, 11021-11023 (1994) (detailing
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enhanced by provisions that require the immediate notification of local
authorities in the event of a release into the environment of a
"reportable quantity" of an extremely hazardous substance or a listed
toxic chemical. 58 The public's right-to-know is protected by three
provisions which require public disclosure of extensive information on
the presence, disposition, and health effects, of any hazardous
chemical used by subject facilities within the community.5 9 These
latter three provisions generate a deluge of information and data which
EPCRA requires be made available to the general public.'
Every facility that is subject to EPCRA's reporting criteria must
notify its respective SERC and LEPC of its qualification under the
Act. 61 Subject facilities include any facility 62 that produces, uses or
EPCRA's reporting requirements).
57. EPCRA directed the EPA to establish threshold quantities for each extremely
hazardous substance it lists in the regulations. Any release occurring in an amount at or
exceeding such quantity constitutes a reportable quantity subject to EPCRA's emergency
notification requirements. See EPCRA §§ 302, 304, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11002, 11004
(1994).
58. See EPCRA § 304(b)-(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(b)-(c). The importance to public
safety of EPCRA's emergency planning-related reporting requirements can best be
illustrated by a recent example. On March 29, 1995, the toxic chemicals muriatic and
hydrochloric acid were spilled from a railroad tank car in Denver, Colorado,
necessitating the evacuation of approximately 200 residents of the area. See Neighbors
For a Toxic Free Community v. Vulcan Materials Co., 964 F. Supp. 1448 (D. Colo.
1997). The two chemicals are listed as "toxic substances" by the EPA, and any release of
such substances into the environment is therefore subject to EPCRA's reporting
requirements. The company responsible for the release, however, did not notify the
proper authorities until four and one-half hours after it had discovered the spill, which
was not neutralized until over 24 hours later. A consumer group subsequently brought
suit, alleging several violations of EPCRA's release reporting requirements. The suit
alleged that defendants had failed to provide the proper authorities with immediate notice
of the spill, and failed "to submit a follow-up emergency notice after the spill, i.e ...
failed to report as soon as practicable on the chemical[s] involved and the health risks
associated with [the chemicals]." Id.
59. See EPCRA §§ 311-313, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021-11023.
60. See EPCRA § 324, 42 U.S.C. § 11044 (1994). This section provides that the
information "shall be made available to the general public ... during normal working
hours at the location or locations designated," and that "[each LEPC] shall annually
publish a notice in local newspapers that the ... forms have been submitted, [and that]
members of the public who wish to review... may do so at the location designated." Id.
§ 324(a)-(b). See also Christiansen and Urquhart, supra note 37, at 242 n.38
(emphasizing that Congress made it clear throughout the Act that information gathered
under EPCRA must be made readily available to the general public in order to advance the
statute's goals).
61. See EPCRA § 303(d), 42 U.S.C. § 11003(d) (1994) (explaining that the facilities
notify the LEPC and then "after completion of an emergency planning district" the LEPC
submits information to the SERC).
62. The term "facility" is defined by the Act to mean "all buildings, equipment,
structures, and other stationary items which are located on a single site or on contiguous
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stores hazardous chemicals at or above threshold amounts, with certain
limited exceptions provided. 3 In general, the owner and operator of
such a facility must report to its respective Local Committee any listed
chemicals being used or handled on-site. 6' The gathered information
must include specific data on the type, quantity, location, and
disposition of such chemicals. 65 In addition, EPCRA requires that
each subject facility prepare and submit annual inventories identifying
what listed toxic chemicals it handled throughout the preceeding
year.66
Section 311 of EPCRA operates in conjunction with the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSHA").67 Under
section 311, all OSHA-regulated facilities 68 must file with their
respective Local Committees either the Material Safety Data Sheets
("MSDS") prepared according to OSHA for each hazardous chemical
handled, or a detailed list ("List") of such chemicals. 69 These
reporting requirements generate enormous amounts of data. In order
to limit the inundation of data somewhat, EPCRA requires the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to study and establish
reporting thresholds according to the degree of dangers presented by
such hazardous chemicals. 70
or adjacent sites and which are owned or operated by the same person." EPCRA §
329(4), 42 U.S.C. § 11049(4) (1994).
63. See EPCRA §§ 304(d), 327, 329(4), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11004(d), 11047, 11049(4)
(1994); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 13,378, 13,384 (1987). Even federal agencies are required
to report under EPCRA due to an executive order signed by President Clinton on August
3, 1993. See Abell, supra note 27, at 587 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,856, 58 Fed. Reg.
41,981 (1993)).
64. See EPCRA § 31I(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11021(a)(1) (1994).
65. See Christiansen and Urquhart, supra note 37, at 242.
66. See EPCRA § 312, 42 U.S.C. § 11022 (1994).
67. See EPCRA § 311; Occupational Health and Safety Act ("OSHA") of 1970, 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-666 (1994).
68. At the time of EPCRA's enactment, OSHA's requirements applied only to
manufacturing facilities; however, these requirements were extended to all employers
when the OSHA regulations were revised in 1987. See 52 Fed. Reg. 31,852 (1987).
This expansion increased to several million the amount of facilities subject to EPCRA's
reporting requirements under sections 311 and 312. See Christiansen and Urquhart,
supra note 37, at 242.
69. See EPCRA § 311, 42 U.S.C. § 11021. For specific guidelines for determining
which chemicals should be classified as "hazardous" by OSHA, see 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1200 (1996).
If a facility chooses not to submit its MSDSs under EPCRA, it must instead provide a
List of such chemicals setting forth information similar to what MSDSs contain, such as
chemical names and their hazardous components, and grouped according to categories of
health and physical hazards established in OSHA. See EPCRA § 31 I(a)(2)(A).
70. See id. § 311(b). These reporting thresholds were designed to "strike the best
balance between the amount and value of information generated by the public, on the
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In addition to the MSDS requirements of section 311, OSHAregulated facilities must also compile and submit annual data
inventories on their handling of hazardous chemicals. 7 Section 312
requires each facility to file with its local committees annual inventory
forms furnishing information on the location and amount of hazardous
chemicals handled by the facility in the preceeding year.72 At the
request of local officials, however, a facility must also provide
additional information, should a more detailedgicture of the chemicals
handled by a particular facility be necessary. Facilities required to
submit such additional information must also permit on-site
inspections by local fire department officials if deemed necessary. 74
Section 313 of EPCRA contains the Act's most noteworthy
reporting provision.75 This section enables the EPA and state officials
to monitor directly the amounts of toxic chemicals released into the
environment by a given facility.76 Section 313 requires facilities to file
annual reports reflecting all releases of any toxic chemicals during the
preceding year.77 The section provides that facilities with ten or more
full-time employees are required to report their total annual releases of
each of more than 600 toxic chemicals in quantities that exceed the
thresholds established by the EPA.' If a facility releases a listed toxic
one hand, and the cost to state and local planning bodies and facilities managing and
providing the information, on the other." Christiansen and Urquhart, supra note 37, at
243.
71. See EPCRA § 312(b).
72. See id. § 312. Information reported on the annual inventory forms is referred to
as "Tier I information" and requires only approximated data in the form of estimated
quantities and general locations of the hazardous chemicals on site. See id. §
312(d)(1)(B)(i)-(iii).
73. See id. § 312(d)(2). This information is referred to as "Tier II information" and
requires more specific data on the type of chemical, its location, and its manner of
storage at the facility in question. See id. § 312(d)(2)(A)-(F). Once obtained by local
authorities, this information must be made available to the general public, although
limited exceptions permit the withholding of certain information at the facility owner's
request. See id. § 312(e)(3)(B).
74. See id. § 312(f).
75. See PERCIVAL E-" AL., supra note 5, at 649 (labeling section 313 as perhaps
EPCRA's most significant new requirement); see also Abell, supra note 27, at 586
(stating that section 313 is EPCRA's most "publicized and controversial" provision)
(citing Kevin J. Finto, Regulation By Information Through EPCRA, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVT., at 13, 46 (1990)); Shavelson, supra note 26, at 31-32 (stating that section 313 is
arguably EPCRA's most important provision).
76. See EPCRA § 313, 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1994); see also PERCIVAL ET AL., supra
note 5, at 649.
77. See also PERCIVAL Er AL., supra note 5 at 649 (stating that section 313 requires
annual reports of any toxic chemical releases).
78. See EPCRA § 313; see also PERCIVAL Er AL., supra note 5, at 649 (summarizing
EPCRA's section 313 requirements).
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chemical' in an amount that meets or exceeds the threshold amount,'
that release must be reported through the submission of a toxic
chemical release form ("Form R"). 8 ' Form R requirements are
comprehensive, applying to all types of chemical releases, in whatever
form, and to all media, including landfill disposal, air emissions,
wastewater discharges, as well as transfers to off-site storage or
treatment facilities. 82
By July 1 of each year, Form R reporting releases of any listed toxic
chemical must be submitted to the EPA and state officials. 3 Once
these reports are collected, EPCRA requires the EPA to maintain an
inventory of data on such releases that is up-to-date and available to the
general public.' The result is the Toxic Release Inventory ("TRI"),85
an on-line computer database fully accessible to the public-the first of
its kind ever mandated by a federal statute."
79. The toxic chemicals in Section 313 refer to those listed at "Toxic Chemicals."
See 40 C.F.R. § 372.65 (1996). In November of 1994, 286 additional toxics were added
by the EPA bringing the total number of chemicals whose release must be reported under
EPCRA to 654. See EPA Addition of Certain Chemicals; Toxic Chemical Release
Reporting; Community Right-to-Know; Final Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,432 (1994).
80. See EPCRA § 313(f)(1). After various interim rulings, the EPA finally published
a final rule effective August 27, 1990, which established reporting thresholds for all
facilities. See Community Right-to-Know Reporting Requirements, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,
632 (1990).
81. See EPCRA § 313. The Form R was created by the EPA as the means for uniform
reporting of all toxic chemical releases. See 40 C.F.R. § 372.85 (1996). Each form
requires the subject facility to provide the following items of information for each listed
toxic chemical known to be present at the facility: (i) the chemical's category of use at
the facility, (ii) an estimate (in ranges) of the maximum amount of the chemical present
at any time during the preceeding calendar year, (iii) a description of the waste treatment
or disposal methods employed and an estimate of the efficiency of such methods for each
wastestream, and (iv) the annual quantity of the toxic chemical entering each
environmental medium. See EPCRA § 313(g)(l)(C).
82. See Christiansen and Urquhart, supra note 37, at 245.
83. See EPCRA § 313(a).
84. See id. § 3130).
85. The TRI database is available to the public through several outlets, including the
"RTK NET," an acronym for the "Right-To-Know Network," an on-line computer service
operated by OMB Watch and The Unison Institute in Washington D.C., see Gary D. Bass
& Alair MacLean, Enhancing the Public's Right-To-Know About Environmental Issues,
4 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 287, 295 n.52 (1993) (defining OMB Watch as a "non-profit group
that advocates for the public's right-to-know and greater government accountability"),
and the National Library of Medicine's "TOXNET" System, see Citizens for a Better
Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1239 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079
(Feb. 24, 1997), which can transmit such information to the public via modem
transmission. Citizens can also order computer diskettes containing TRI information
from the EPA and other sources. See Shavelson, supra note 26, at 30. Of course, TRI
database information is also available to citizens in hard copy form under freedom of
information laws. See id.
86. See Bass and MacLean, supra note 85, at 294. Unfortunately, it was not until two
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Although Form R requirements apply only to facilities which handle
toxic chemicals in threshold amounts," the scope of section 313 is still
very broad.' 8 For certain listed toxic chemicals, any release, no matter
how small, by a facility handling such chemicals must be reported.89
Thus, unlike EPCRA's other reporting provisions, section 313
imposes no threshold amount for imposing its release reporting
requirements. Revisions to the listed toxic chemicals, their threshold
amounts, and the subject facility criteria, are made at the discretion of
the EPA.90
The TRI database contains an extraordinary amount of numerical
data. 91 Before such data can be ready for dissemination to me public,
it must be analyzed by the EPA. 92 The data provided on each chemical
must be thoroughly examined for characteristics of toxicity, exposure,
degradation, and other factors in order to assist communication with
energy planning.93 Such information can then be accessed and used
by a variety of organizations, including industry, government, and
public interest groups. 4 Further, the TRI database is supplemented by
information obtained under other federal regulatory programs.'

and one-half years after EPCRA's passage that the EPA finally opened
telecommunications lines to the database. See id. at 296.
87. See EPCRA § 313(a).
88. See Abell, supra note 27, at 586. With the exception of certain exempted
facilities, generally every facility employing ten or more full-time employees, or
engaging in general manufacturing is required to report releases of any listed toxic
chemical used or handled in excess of the threshold quantity. See EPCRA §
313(b)(l)(A), (f)(1). However, it should be noted that several major sources of pollution
are among those facilities exempted from section 313, including dry cleaners, public
utilities, landfills, incinerators, and gas stations. See Abell, supra note 27, at 587.
89. See Christiansen and Urquhart, supra note 37, at 245.
90. See EPCRA § 302(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 11002(a)(3) (1994); see EPCRA § 313(b),
(d), (f), 42 U.S.C. § 11023(b), (d), (f) (1994).
Although such revisions are
discretionary, EPCRA requires that chemical characteristics such as toxicity, reactivity,
volatility, dispersability, combustibility, and flammability must be taken into
consideration by the EPA when making such revisions. See EPCRA § 302(a)(4).
91. See Christiansen and Urquhart, supra note 37, at 251.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 246. Christiansen and Urquhart describe the TRI data as "a benchmark
for new regulatory programs, as well as a catalyst for pollution prevention activities."
Id.; see also EPA, ToxIcs IN THE COMMUNITY: NATIONAL AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES 251
(1991).
95. See Christiansen and Urquhart, supra note 37, at 250 (citing the Toxic Substances
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-519, 3(c)(1), 100 Stat. 2989 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 26012671 (1988)); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 92516, § 2, 86 Stat. 998 (codified at 7 U.S.C. 136-136Y (1988))).
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3. EPCRA's Enforcement Provisions
To assist in accomplishing EPCRA's objectives, Congress provided
a wide variety of mechanisms for enforcement of EPCRA's reporting
provisions. 96 First, Congress authorized the EPA to enforce EPCRA
compliance through civil or administrative procedures 97 and even went
so far as to allow the EPA to impose criminal penalties. 9 Local
SERCs and LEPCs have been given the authority to enforce EPCRA
through declaratory or injunctive actions. 99 Finally, EPCRA section
326 permits citizens to sue the EPA if the EPA fails to comply with its
non-discretionary obligations under the Act.'0°
Penalties imposed under EPCRA are set to deter non-compliance
and to ensure timely and accurate reporting by facilities.'I ' A violating
facility can be subject to maximum penalties of $25,000 per day for the
first violation.'12 Repeated daily violations of EPCRA's reporting
requirements may constitute separate violations; therefore, the failure
to comply can result in substantial penalties. 3 Repeated violations of
EPCRA can subject a facility to fines of up to $75,000 per day.'0 4
These penalties are made payable to the United States Treasury.05
Although private litigants bringing suit under EPCRA do not receive
"bounties" from successful citizen suits,'16 they may recover the costs
of litigation, including reasonable attorneys fees and any further costs
as determined by the court.' °7
4. EPCRA's Citizen Suit Provision
In addition to the remedies enforceable by the EPA, state officials,
and Local Committees, EPCRA grants enforcement authority to the
ordinary private citizen.'08 EPCRA permits private citizens to initiate,
96. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1240 (7th Cir. 1996),
cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (Feb. 24, 1997).
97. See EPCRA § 325, 42 U.S.C. § 11045 (1994).
98. See id.
99. See EPCRA § 326, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1994).
100. See id. § 326(a)(1)(B).
101. See EPCRA § 325, 42 U.S.C. § 11045 (1994).
102. See id. § 325(b), (c). The failure to properly submit a Form R will subject a
facility to a maximum penalty of $25,000 per day; failure to properly submit an MSDS
will subject a facility to a $10,000 per day maximum penalty. See id.
103. See id. § 325(c)(3).
104. See id. § 325(b)(2).
105. See id. § 325.
106. See Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 813 F. Supp.
1132, 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
107. See EPCRA § 326(0,42 U.S.C. § 11046(f) (1994).
108. See id. § 326.
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on their own behalf, civil proceedings against an owner or operator of
a facility who fails to comply with the Act's reporting requirements. 9
EPCRA's citizen suit provision provides:
[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf
against the following: (A) An owner or operator of a facility for
failure to do any of the following: (i) Submit a follow-up
emergency notice under section 11004(c) of this title. (ii)
Submit a material safety data sheet or a list under section
11021(a) of this title. (iii) Complete and submit an inventory
form under section 11022(a) of this title ...(iv) Complete and
submit a toxic chemical release form under section 11023(a) of
this title . ..."0
In addition, this provision expressly grants jurisdiction to private
citizens in the district courts "to enforce the requirement concerned and
to impose any civil penalty provided for violation of that
requirement."..
A variety of EPCRA violations can give rise to a private cause of
action, including the failure to: (1) submit an emergency notice of a
chemical release under section 304; (2) submit MSDSs or on-site
chemicals lists under section 311(a); (3) file an annual chemical
inventory form under section 312; or (4) file a Form R under section
313(a)." 2 EPCRA's citizen suit provision employs private parties to
aid in enforcing compliance with EPCRA's reporting and notification
requirements. 113
Like most other federal environmental laws, EPCRA prohibits
citizen suits where the EPA or another governmental enforcement
authority is already involved." 4 Section 326(e) prohibits private civil
actions from taking place where "the Administrator has commenced
and is diligently prosecuting the same matter in a criminal or judicial
proceeding.""15 The intent of this restriction on citizen enforcement is
to prevent citizen suits from interfering with the enforcement discretion
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Id. § 326(c).
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. § 326(e).
115. Id. In its entirety, section 326(e) provides:
(e) No action may be commenced under subsection (a) of this section against
an owner or operator of a facility if the Administrator has commenced and is
diligently pursuing an administrative order or civil action to enforce the
requirement concerned or to impose a civil penalty under this chapter with
respect to the violation of requirement.
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exercised by federal and state authorities." 16
In addition, citizens intending to bring suit in federal court under
EPCRA are required to provide the EPA, state officials, and the
alleged violator with notice of their intent to file suit at least sixty-days
before commencing any action." 7 Any governmental enforcement
occurring during this sixty-day notice period will extinguish the
8
citizen's right to bring suit under EPCRA." i
If such authorities fail to
take action within the sixty-day notice period, the Act allows private
citizens to pursue civil remedies in the district courts against the alleged
violator. However, should the EPA or State choose not to pursue an
action against an alleged violator within the sixty-day notice period,
either authority may still intervene at any time during the course of an
on-going action "as a matter of right."" 9
Strict compliance with notice provisions such as EPCRA's has been
held by the Supreme Court to be a mandatory prerequisite or condition
precedent to citizen suit jurisdiction in the federal courts.' 20 EPCRA's
sixty-day notice requirement serves two essential functions. First, it
enables state and federal authorities, as primary enforcers of the Act's
requirements, to investigate the matter and intervene if necessary.
Second, sixty-days notice gives
the alleged violator time to comply
2
with the Act's requirements.1 '
A recent case helps illustrate how EPCRA's sixty-day notice
requirement can come in conflict with its provision for citizen
enforcement. In the case of Don't Waste Arizona, Inc. v. McLane
Foods,122 a citizen organization ("DWA") brought suit against McLane
Foods ("McLane") for EPCRA violations during the years of 1993 and
116. See PERCIVAL Er AL., supra note 5, at 1091.
117. See EPCRA § 326(d), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(d).
118. See Don't Waste Arizona, Inc. v. McLane Foods, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 972, 975
(D.Ariz. 1997). Contra Neighbors for a Toxic Free Community v. Vulcan Materials,
964 F. Supp. 1448 (D. Colo. 1997). In Vulcan Materials, the court held that plaintiff's
citizen suit was not barred by the EPA's intervention in the matter because the consent
agreement reached between the EPA and the defendant concerned only CERCLA
violations and made no mention of the EPCRA violations which plaintiff's suit alleged.
See id. For a more detailed discussion of Vulcan Materials, see supra note 58.
119. EPCRA § 326(h)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(h)(1).
120. See, e.g., Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (holding that
citizen suit was precluded by petitioner's failure to satisfy the plain language of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 detailing a 60-day notice requirement
and notification of both state officials and the EPA of its intent to sue an alleged
violator).
121. See id. at 29 (citing Gwaltney, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S.
49, 60 (1987)); see infra Part II.B.2 (discussing more fully the Gwaltney, Ltd. case).
122. 950 F. Supp. 972 (D. Ariz. 1997).

240

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 29

1994. ' McLane, a food preparer and distributor used large quantities
of ammonia as a coolant for its spiral freezer." Because McLane kept
more than 500 pounds of ammonia on its site, which had been
classified as an extremely hazardous substance for purposes of
EPCRA reporting, McLane was required to file annual reports with its
Local Committees pursuant to EPCRA section 312.'25
McLane failed to file the required reports, and on April 28, 1995,
DWA notified the EPA Administrator, the Arizona Department of
Quality, and McLane of its intent to sue as required by EPCRA section
326.26 Subsequently on May 12, 1995, McLane filed its reports for
the years 1993 and 1994, indicating that 4500 pounds of ammonia had
been handled on site during each of those calendar years.'27 Because
no action was taken by state or federal officials within the notice
period, on August 28, 1995, DWA filed its complaint in the district
court seeking injunctive relief, civil penalties, and attorney's fees and
costs.' 8 McLane challenged the suit, arguing that the recent cure of its
non-compliance deprived DWA of its cause of action and the court of
its jurisdiction over the citizen suit.'29 The court, concurring with the
held that a citizen suit can be based on a
Seventh Circuit's analysis,
130
violation.
past
wholly
B. Citizen Suits Priorto Citizensfor a Better Environment
Thus, it is EPCRA's sixty-day notice provision which directly gives
rise to the current conflict among the circuit courts over whether citizen
suits can be permitted based only on historical violations.' 3 ' With the
Seventh Circuit's ruling in Citizensfor a Better Environment, the grant
of jurisdictional authority conferred to private citizens under EPCRA
32
appears to encompass actions for purely historical violations.'
However, prior to Citizens for a Better Environment, the vitality of
citizen enforcement provisions (arising out of EPCRA and many other
environmental statutes) had been left in doubt by a number of rulings

123. See id. at 973.
124. See id. at 972-73.
125. See id. at 973.
126. See id. See also EPCRA § 326(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(d)(1) (1994).
127. See Don't Waste Arizona, 950 F. Supp. at 973.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See infra notes 286-91 and accompanying text.
131. See supra Part II.A.4; see also infra Part III.
132. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1237; see infra Part III.A.3
(discussing Citizens for a Better Env't more fully).
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which appeared to restrict their reach. 33 To determine what impact the
Citizens for a Better Environment holding will have on the
enforcement authority of private citizens under EPCRA, it is necessary
to review how citizen suit provisions have evolved in environmental
legislation and to examine how courts have construed such provisions
in the past.
1. The Origins of Citizen Suits
Nearly every major piece of environmental legislation contains
citizen suit provisions similar to those in EPCRA.'- 4 While differing
in precise language, citizen suit provisions generally authorize any
person to commence an action in the district court against a violator of
a particular statute, provided that there is also a failure of 13a5
governmental or administrative body to pursue the alleged violation.
Professor Joseph Sax is credited with developing the concept of the
citizen suit more than twenty-five years ago.' Motivated by the threat
to environmental laws posed by budgetary and political limitations on
government enforcement, Sax advocated granting private citizens the
authority to enforce such laws.' 37 In light of the limited resources with
which state and local governments are left to fulfill legislative
mandates, citizen suits serve an essential function of supplementing

133. See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments, U.S.A.,
Inc., 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied en banc, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 30933
(6th Cir. Oct. 16, 1995); see infra Part III.A.2 (discussing United Musical Instruments
Inc. more fully).
134. See, e.g., and compare Endangered Species Act § 11, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)
(1994); Toxic Substances Control Act § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972 (the "Clean Water Act") § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994);
Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994), amended by 42 U.S.C. §
300j-8 (1996); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA") § 7002, 42
U.S.C. § 6972 (1984), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994); Clean Air Act of 1970 (the
"Clean Air Act") § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994); Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") § 310, 42 U.S.C. §
9659 (1994); (containing citizen suit provisions), with Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136-136y (1994) (omitting a provision for citizen
suits).
135. See Beverly McQueary Smith, Recent Developments in Citizens' Suits Under
Selected Federal Environmental Statutes, C981 A.L.I.A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY
MATERIALS (Feb. 16-18, 1995), available in LEXIS, Cle Library, ALI-ABA File.
136. See e.g., Shavelson, supra note 26, at 29 (noting that "[Clongress borrowed a
novel concept from a Michigan law drafted by Professor Joseph Sax, and included it in
the 1970 Clean Air Act."); see also Peter H. Lehner, The Efficiency of Citizen Suits, 2
ALB. L. ENvTL. OUTLOOK 4 (1995).
137. See JOSEPH SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACrION
(1971).
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138
governmental enforcement.
Congress recognized the logical utility of such a concept and
incorporated the first federal environmental citizen suit provision into
the Clean Air Act of 1970 ("Clean Air Act"). 139 Under this provision,
private citizens have the authority to pursue private civil remedies
against violators of the act's air pollution laws-whether the alleged
violators are other private parties or the EPA itself.' 4° This permits
private citizens to act as "private attorneys general''4 to enforce a
federal environmental law and to become more involved than ever
before. 42 Grants of private enforcement authority have subsequently
been incorporated into environmental statutes by Congress for more
than twenty years. 43

2. Gwaltney, Ltd.: The Supreme Court's View of Citizen Suits
Despite apparent widespread Congressional acceptance of the
concept,'" the Supreme Court adopted a narrow interpretation of
citizen suit legislation on its only occasion for review. In Gwaltney,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 45 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve a split among circuits almost identical to
the one that is the subject of this Comment: the circuits were in
disagreement over whether historical violations gave rise to a cause of
action under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act. 46 In
138. See, e.g., Shavelson, supra note 26, at 29. Shavelson asserts that "[i]n the late
1960's, it became painfully clear that government regulation and voluntary industry
compliance alone were not sufficient to protect the environment." Id.
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994).
140. See id. The citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act confer enforcement
authority through two types of suits: it permits (1) citizens to sue dischargers of
pollution in violation of the Clean Air Act's source-specific limitations, and (2) suits
against the EPA for failing to carry-out its administrative obligations as required under
the act. See Lehner, supra note 136, at 4-5.
The Clean Air Act's legislative history indicates that by including a citizen suit
provision, Congress intended to "strike a balance between encouraging citizen
enforcement of environmental regulations and avoiding burdening the federal courts
with excessive numbers of citizen suits." Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20,
29 (1989) (citing 116 CONG. REC. S32927 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie)).
141. Shavelson, supra note 26, at 29.
142. See id.
143. See Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 813 F. Supp.
1132, 1137 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1993); see supra note 134 (listing congressional acts
containing citizen suit provisions).
144. See supra note 134 (listing congressional acts containing citizen suit
provisions).
145. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
146. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1987 ("Clean Water Act") §
505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1987) (amending the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
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Gwaltney, Ltd., the Court held that a suit brought for "wholly past
47
violations" was not sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction.
According to the Court, the Clean Water Act authorizes citizens to seek
civil remedies "only in a suit brought to enjoin or otherwise abate an
on-going violation."' 4
Gwaltney, Ltd. involved a citizen suit for declaratory and injunctive
relief brought against a facility for violating the effluent limitations of
its NPDES permit. 49 The facility, a meat-packing plant that had
repeatedly violated discharge limitations for seven different pollutants,
moved for dismissal on jurisdictional grounds because the complaint
lacked any allegation that the facility was "in violation" of its permit
when the action was filed. 15° The Clean Water Act provides that in the
absence of federal or state enforcement, private citizens can pursue
civil remedies against anyone "alleged to be in violation of" the act's
provisions.' 5 ' The district court denied the motion and held that the
language-"to be in violation"- could reasonably mean either prior
unlawful conduct or conduct that continues into the present.' 52 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed, giving rise to a three-way conflict among the
circuits' 53 over the scope of citizen enforcement authority conferred by
of 1972 ("Clean Water Act") § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1972)).
147. Gwaltney, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 56.
148. Id. at 59. In support of its holding, the Court stated, "[o]ur reading . ..is
bolstered by the language and structure of the rest of the citizen suit provisions ....
These provisions together make plain that the interest of the citizen-plaintiff is
primarily forward-looking." Id.
149. See id. at 49. NPDES stands for National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System-a state-issued permit program authorized under the Clean Water Act § 402, 33
U.S.C. § 1342 (1994) (authorizing states to issue wastewater discharge permits through
their own Clean Water Act permit programs, as long as those programs comply with
federal standards).
150. See Gwaltney, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 54. Although a violation did not exist at the
time the complaint was filed, the Court noted that, "[b]etween 1981 and 1984, petitioner
repeatedly violated conditions of the permit by exceeding effluent limitations." Id. at
53. The Clean Water Act provides that private citizens may commence civil actions
against any person "alleged to be in violation of" the conditions of an NPDES permit.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1988).
151. Id.
152. See Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1547 (E.D.
Va. 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 484 U.S. 49 (1987). According
to the District Court: "[t]he words 'to be in violation' may reasonably be read as
comprehending unlawful conduct that occurred solely prior to the filing of the lawsuit as
well as unlawful conduct that continues into the present." Id. The District Court also
found, in the alternative, that claimants had satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of
the Act because they alleged in good faith that violations of the facility's NPDES permit
were persisting at the time of suit. See id. at 1549 n.8.
153. By affirming the district court's ruling, the Fourth Circuit expressly rejected the
Fifth Circuit approach adopted in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 756 F.2d
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the Clean Water Act (similar to the currently existing conflict
surrounding citizen suits under EPCRA).1m
As a result of this conflict, the Supreme Court in Gwaltney, Ltd.
determined whether the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision grants
jurisdiction for anything other than on-going violations 55 The Court
concluded that the jurisdictional authority for citizen suits under the
Clean Water Act is "primarily forward-looking."' Because EPCRA
permits administrative actions for on-going as well as historical
violations, citizen actions must be limited to only prospective relief."5
The Court reasoned that Congress intended the citizen suit to be used
exclusively as a device for enforcing compliance, rather than as an
additional provision for civil penalties.'5 The Gwaltney, Ltd. Court
analyzed both the act's plain language and its intended purpose to
arrive at this narrow interpretation of citizen suits under the Clean
Water Act.

392 (5th Cir. 1985). See Gwaltney, Ltd., 791 F.2d at 312. Meanwhile, the First Circuit
had also been asked to examine section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act. See Pawtuxet
Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1986).
Adopting neither position, the First Circuit had held that jurisdiction lies when "the
citizen-plaintiff fairly alleges a continuing likelihood" that violations will again occur.
Id.
154. The First Circuit's approach precluded citizen suits for wholly past violations,
but permitted them when there existed a pattern of intermittent violations even if there
was no violation at the time suit was filed. See Gwaltney, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 56 (citing
Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc., 807 F.2d at 1094). Such an approach falls squarely
between the positions taken by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits in the present conflict
over EPCRA § 326. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 1079 (Feb. 24, 1997); Atlantic States Legal Found. v.
United Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc., 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied en
banc, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 30933 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 1995).
155. See Gwaltney, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 52.
156. Id. at 59. In acknowledging ambiguity regarding the interpretation of the
phrase "to be in violation," the Court stated, "[t]he prospective orientation of th[e]
phrase ['in violation'] could not have escaped Congress' attention." Id. at 57.
157. See id. at 58-59. The Court added that:
Congress had used identical language in the citizen suit provisions of several
other environmental statutes that authorize only prospective relief [listing
such statutes]. Moreover, Congress has demonstrated in yet other statutory
provisions that it knows how to avoid this prospective implication.
Id. at 57.
158. See id. at 58-59. Despite an incorporation by reference of similar language
which granted authority for civil enforcement of historical violations by the EPA, the
Court rejected such a grant of authority to private citizens. Citing Tull v. United States,
481 U.S. 412 (1987), the Court held that injunctive relief and civil penalties are
separately authorized, and therefore, the Clean Water Act's provision permitting civil
actions by the EPA Administrator for past violations could not be likewise applied to its
injunctive citizen suit provisions. See id.
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In its analysis of the language, the Court viewed Congress'
"undeviating use of the present tense" in the Clean Water Act as
evidence that the grant of authority for citizen suits was intended to
address only present or future non-compliance.' 59 According to the
Court, the syntax used by Congress in this provision demonstrates that
the citizen suit was not meant to address violations that had been
corrected by the time the suit was filed. 60 This language provided the
Court with "a striking indicia of the prospective orientation" of the
Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision.' 6' Furthermore, the Clean
Water Act contains no explicit reference to historical violationssomething that Congress has included in statutory language when
desired. 62 Because Congress did not specifically allow for citizen
plaintiffs to sue for wholly past violations, the Court63reasoned that
Congress intended to authorize only prospective relief.'
The Gwaltney, Ltd. Court also relied on legislative history to
support its finding that the Clean Water Act does not permit citizen
suits for historical violations.' 64 It concluded that the citizen suit "is
meant to supplement rather than supplant" governmental
enforcement.' 65 In support of this conclusion, the Court drew from
evidence in House and Senate Reports that the Clean Water Act's
citizen suit provisions were closely linked to those of the Clean Air
Act,' 66 which were exclusively injunctive remedies, authorizing only
prospective relief. 67 The similarities in the language of the two
statutes suggest that Congress intended both statutes' citizen
enforcement provisions to be analogous.6'

159. See id. at 59.
160. See id.
161. Id. According to the Court, this conclusion was supported by the "pervasive use
of the present tense" throughout the relevant section. Id.
162. See id. at 57 n.2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1984) (amending the Solid Waste
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1978))).
163. See id. The Gwaltney, Ltd., Court noted that Congress could have phrased its
grant of enforcement authority in language which looked to the past, i.e., "to have
violated." Id.
164. See id. at 61.
165. Id. at 60.
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994).
167. See Gwaltney, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 57 (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-911, at 133). The
court stated that the "[Clean Water Act] Section 505 closely follows the concepts
utilized in section 304 of the Clean Air AcL" Id. at 62.
168. See id. The Court considered the language-"to be in violation"-to be a term
of art used intentionally by Congress to permit citizen involvement only where no
government action takes place. Id.
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Furthermore, to support its view of citizen suits as purely a
supplement to government enforcement, the Gwaltney, Ltd. Court
pointed to the Clean Water Act's notice provisions. 69 The Clean
Water Act includes notice provisions similar to those in EPCRA,
requiring a citizen plaintiff to provide sixty-days notice of an intent to
sue.' 70 The Court viewed the concept of notice as logically
inconsistent with allowing a citizen suit for past violations.' T7 The
purpose of a notice period, in the Court's view, is to obviate the need
for citizen enforcement if the alleged violator brings itself into
compliance. 172 Allowing remedies to private citizens for historical
violations would undermine what Congress envisioned to be only a
supplementary role for the citizen suit under the Clean Water Act. 73
According to the Court, the nature of this role would become
troublesome should citizens be permitted to sue for wholly past
violations when a facility has cured its non-compliance. 74
The Gwaltney, Ltd. holding substantially restricts the enforcement
authority of citizen plaintiffs under the Clean Water Act. 75 With the
169. See id. at 60-61.
170. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (1994). As support that citizen suits were
permitted only to enforce compliance and not for civil penalties for past violations, the
Court noted that private actions are barred where the EPA or state has already initiated
some action requiring compliance. See Gwaltney, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 60 n.3, (citing 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B)).
171. See Gwaltney, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 59-60 ("Any other conclusion would render
incomprehensible [the Clean Water Act's] notice provision..."). Because the notice
provision includes a remedy for deficiency, the Court reasoned that Congress' rationale
for the provision was not to penalize the company: "[i]f we assume ... that citizen suits
may target wholly past violations, the requirement of notice to the alleged violator
becomes gratuitous." Id. at 60.
172. See id. According to the Court, "[iut follows logically that the purpose of notice
to the alleged violator is to give it an opportunity to bring itself into complete
compliance and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit." Id.
173. See id. The Court believed that adoption of a broader interpretation would create
"a disturbing anomaly" stating:
Suppose that the Administrator identified a violator of the Act and issued a
compliance order . . . [but] agreed not to assess or otherwise seek civil
penalties on the condition that the violator take some extreme corrective
action, such as to install particularly effective but expensive machinery, that
it otherwise would not be obliged to take. If citizens could file suit, months or
years later, in order to seek the civil penalties that the Administrator chose to
forego, then the Administrator's discretion to enforce the Act in the public
interest would be curtailed considerably. The same might be said of state
enforcement authorities.
Id. at 60-61.
174. See id. at 61. The court reasoned that "[This] interpretation of the scope of the
citizen suit would change the nature of the citizens' role from interstitial to potentially
intrusive. We cannot agree that Congress intended such a result." Id.
175. See id. at 56.
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Supreme Court's decision that the Clean Water Act only authorizes
citizens to seek civil penalties in suits brought to "enjoin or otherwise
abate an ongoing violation,"'' 76 an initial precedent was set for what
1 77
effect was to be given private remedies in environmental statutes.
While a narrow reading of citizen suits under the Clean Water Act
resulted, at least one court has applied the Gwaltney analysis to justify
a strict 7interpretation
of citizen suits under other environmental
8
statutes.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Citizen Suits Under EPCRA Priorto Citizens for a Better
Environment
EPCRA was drafted almost one year after the Gwaltney, Ltd. ruling
and in the wake of its tapered view of citizen enforcement. However,
in drafting EPCRA's citizen suit provision, Congress utilized language
that differs distinctly from that used in the Clean Water Act. 179 While
the citizen suit provision narrowed in Gwaltney, Ltd. authorizes citizen
actions against those "alleged to be in violation," EPCRA's citizen suit
provision permits such suits against a person "for the failure to
comply" with the Act's requirements. Some commentators have found
this syntactical distinction significant, 8 ' and the district courts
examining the issue have also distinguished EPCRA's language from
the Clean Water Act and Gwaltney, Ltd.'
1. District Court Treatment of Citizen Suits Under EPCRA
The dynamics of the debate which EPCRA's enforcement
provisions have engendered can be illustrated by examining the
176. Id. at 59.
177. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 32 (1989); Atlantic States
Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 809 F. Supp. 1040, 1044 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd,
12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993), amended by 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 35911 (2d Cir. Dec. 14,
1993) (holding that the discharge of unlisted pollutants is not unlawful under the Clean
Water Act).
178. See, e.g., Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 29 (using similar reasoning in an analysis of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994));
Atlantic States Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc., 61 F.3d 473
(6th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied en banc, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 30933 (6th Cir. Oct. 16,
1995) (applying Gwaltney analysis to citizen suit provisions of EPCRA).
179. See EPCRA § 326, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1994).
180. See, e.g., Abell, supra note 27, at 599 (recognizing that "[bly contrast, it
appears that citizens may maintain a suit under EPCRA for past violations that are not
continuing"); Pritchard, supra note 27, at 242.
181. See infra Part III.A.1.
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decisions of several district courts, all of which agree that citizens can
sue violators for wholly past violations. The decisions came down
prior to the Sixth Circuit's decision in United Musical Instruments.
In Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Whiting Roll-Up Door
Manufacturing,'8 a United States District Court in New York held that
EPCRA reporting violations that had already been corrected could still
constitute grounds for a private civil action. 8 3 In a case of first
impression, the Whiting Roll- Up Door Manufacturingcourt engaged
in a thorough examination of EPCRA's provisions, its legislative
intent, and the goals behind its enactment."8 EPCRA's plain language
and well-documented legislative purpose compelled the Whiting RollUp Door Manufacturing court to hold that EPCRA authorizes civil
actions brought by private citizens for "reporting violations which are
not continuing at the time the lawsuit is filed."' The court concluded
that barring citizen suits once reporting has occurred would impede
EPCRA's intended goals of effective emergency response planning
and public safety.' 86
First, the Whiting Roll-Up Door Manufacturing court found that,
when logically viewed together, the language contained in EPCRA's
reporting, enforcement, and civil penalty provisions compelled the
conclusion that EPCRA confers federal jurisdiction over citizen
lawsuits for past violations. 87 The court noted that because EPCRA's
reporting provisions establish mandatory dates for initial compliance,
such dates must be considered to constitute "requirements" for
purposes of EPCRA's civil penalty provision. 88
182. 772 F. Supp. 745 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
183. See id. at 749. In Whiting Roll-Up Door Manufacturing, a citizens'
environmental organization notified an industrial door manufacturing facility of its
intent to file a civil suit for violations of EPCRA reporting requirements. See id. The
plaintiff's notice letter alleged that defendant had "failed to accurately complete and
submit" the required MSDS, inventory, and toxic chemical release forms for the years
1987-1989 pursuant to EPCRA sections 311, 312, 313. See id. Following inaction by
the EPA within sixty days, during which the facility filed numerous overdue forms with
designated agencies, the plaintiff commenced its suit seeking civil penalties for
defendant's failure to comply with EPCRA's required reporting dates. See id.
184. See id. In holding that the Act does authorize citizen suits, the court stated,
"[tihis court must decide this narrow issue: Does EPCRA authorize citizen suits for
reporting violations which are not continuing at the time the lawsuit is filed .... This
Court must conclude in the affirmative." Id.
185. Id. at 753.
186. See id. at 751.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 750. As the court stated:
[Tihe compliance dates constitute requirements of the reporting provisions;
the unequivocal language of §§ 311-313 requires initial reporting on dates
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Second, the Whiting Roll-Up Door Manufacturing court took into
consideration the legislative history's numerous references to the
protection of the public health and environment. t89 The court's
opinion closely observed the two fundamental objectives sought by
Congress through enactment of EPCRA: public access to information
on hazardous chemicals and the use of such information for local
emergency response planning and control.'
In the court's
assessment, EPCRA's facilitation of awareness and safety hinges
upon an industry's timely compliance with the reporting
requirements.' 9 ' Thus, the Whiting Roll-Up Door Manufacturing
court reasoned that EPCRA's success and development would be
critically undercut by the failure to enforce the statutorily mandated
dates of initial compliance."
Several months later, the Northern District Court of California
followed this reasoning in Williams v. Leybold Technologies, Inc.' 93
The Williams court described Whiting Roll-Up Door Manufacturing's
reasoning as "sound and fully applicable" because EPCRA's plain
language does not expressly require continuing violations at the time of
suit.' 94 The court also considered EPCRA's dual-purpose legislative
intent,' 95 and found that its language and history support the
certain . . . . [Tlhis court cannot reconcile the defendant's interpretation with
EPCRA's civil penalty provision which authorizes civil penalties against
"[any person who .
violates any requirement..
of EPCRA's reporting
provisions.
Id.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 751. The court added, "[tihe relative achievement of these objectives,
then, depends on accurate and current information." Id.
191. See id. (noting that "[tihe required filing of the MSDS pursuant to § 311 is
obviously a critical first step to achieving the intent of EPCRA").
192. See id. Stating that "[tlo overlook EPCRA's reporting deadlines would subvert
the objectives of EPCRA." Id.
193. 784 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
194. See id. at 768. The court decided that Whiting Roll-Up Door Manufacturing
could be applied even though the case before it involved a change in the federal
reporting requirements. See id. In Williams, a former employee sought civil penalties,
attorney's fees and costs against a facility for its failure to report the use of nickel and
nickel compounds in its manufacturing operations from 1986 to 1990 as required by
EPCRA. See id. In July of 1990, however, the United States EPA increased the threshold
reporting limits under section 11021(a)(1) for nickel and other hazardous substances to
levels above those being reported by the facility at the time. See 42 U.S.C. §
11021(a)(1) (1994). Even though under the amendments the facility was no longer
liable under EPCRA, the court permitted the citizen plaintiff's suit for past violations
because the statutory requirements of proper notice had been satisfied and EPA officials
chose not to prosecute the action. See Williams, 784 F. Supp. at 768.
195. See id. at 768 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-962 (1986)). See also supra Part
III.A.1.
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conclusion that historical violations should not be barred from citizen
enforcement.'96
One year later, a Pennsylvania district court, in Delaware Valley
Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 19 7 also followed this
reasoning, adding further credibility to this interpretation. The
Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition court upheld EPCRA's citizen suit
provision against various constitutional challenges.'98 In the process,
it determined that the eventual filing of the required forms did not make
up for violations occurring previously over a long period.' 99
Accordingly, the court concluded that EPCRA's notice requirements
were not at odds with the concept of citizen suits for wholly past
violations.2" In addition, the Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition court
easily distinguished the Gwaltney, Ltd. ruling on the basis of clear
20
differences in language between EPCRA and the Clean Water Act. '
2. United Musical Instruments: The Sixth Circuit's View of Citizen
Suits Under EPCRA
As noted previously, prior to the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Citizensfor a Better Environment, only one other federal appeals court
had addressed historical violations under EPCRA.20 2 The Sixth
Circuit examined this issue in 1995 in United Musical Instruments
U.S.A., Inc. v. Atlantic States Legal Foundation.0 3 In United
Musical Instruments, the right of private enforcement under EPCRA
was narrowed under the influence of the Clean Water Act and the

196. See Williams, 784 F. Supp. at 768. The court stated that "[tlogether, the
legislative history and the plain language of the statute compel the conclusion that past
violations are not exempt from EPCRA's citizen suit provisions." Id.
197. 813 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
198. See id. at 1136. In Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition, a decorative foil
manufacturer was sued by two non-profit environmental organizations for its failure to
submit annual reports of toxic chemical releases (Form Rs). All of the reports were
eventually filed, although not until after plaintiffs had submitted to the manufacturer
their 60-day intent-to-sue letter. See id.
199. See id. at 1141. According to the court, "[allthough filing ends the statutory
violation, it does not necessarily cause the immediate cessation of any injury caused by
the violation." Id.
200. See id. (noting that Congress has included notice provisions in environmental
statutes, for example in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994), even when past
violations are contemplated).
201. See id.
202. See 90 F.3d 1237, 1238 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (Feb.
24, 1997).
203. 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied en banc, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
30933 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 1995).
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rationale used by the Supreme Court in Gwaltney, Ltd.2" Although
the aforementioned district court decisions had all found EPCRA's
citizen suit provision distinguishable from that contained in the Clean
20 6
Water Act, 20 5 the Sixth Circuit arrived at a different conclusion.
Rather than following the example of the district courts, the Sixth
Circuit chose to extend the Supreme Court's holding in Gwaltney,
Ltd. beyond the Clean Water Act and apply it in the context of
EPCRA's own citizen suit provision.20 7
In United Musical Instruments, the manufacturer United Musical
Instruments, U.S.A., Inc. ("United Musical") had failed to comply
with EPCRA's Form R submission requirements for toxic chemicals
which had been released from its production facility during the years
19 8 7 -1 9 9 0. 208 In 1992, a not-for-profit corporation, Atlantic States
Legal Foundation ("ASLF'), notified United Musical of its intent to
sue for these violations of EPCRA's reporting requirements. 2" One
year later, after the EPA had failed to pursue an enforcement action of
its own against United Musical, 2 '0 ASLF filed a complaint in federal
court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, civil penalties, and
attorney's fees. 21 ' In the interim, however, United Musical had
submitted the required forms upon receiving notice of ASLF's intent to
sue. 212 United Musical subsequently moved for dismissal which the
court granted on statute of limitations grounds, and ASLF appealed.2 3
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal but
on different grounds. 214 The court concluded that EPCRA's citizen
204. See id. at 477.
205. See id. at 476-77. See also supra notes 182-200 and accompanying text.
206. See United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 478.
207. See id. at 477. The court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in
Gwaltney, Ltd. could be appropriately applied to EPCRA: "[wie consider the conclusion
in Gwaltney about the significance of the Clean Water Act's notice requirement equally
[Tihe discussion in the Gwaltney opinion concerning the
applicable to EPCRA ....
supplemental role of citizen suits applies in the EPCRA context as well." Id.
208. See id. at 475; see also EPCRA § 313, 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1994).
209. See United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 474.
210. See EPCRA § 326(e), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(e).
211. See United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 474.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 474-75. In dismissing the suit, the district court held that it was timebarred. See id. at 475. It reached this as a result of applying the most closely analogous
statute of limitations under state law (in this case, Ohio), which has been held proper in
cases where Congress did not expressly provided a statute of limitations. See id. at 475
n.2 (citations omitted). Consequently, the parties never raised, and the district court
never reached, the historical violations issue. See id.
214. See id. at 475. The Sixth Circuit based its ruling on the historical violations
issue, which was not addressed in the district court, but had been first raised by United

252

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 29

suit provision contemplates only prospective relief-that is, relief only
for continuing or on-going violations and not for non-compliance that
has been cured by the eventual filing of the overdue forms.21 5
Unavailingly, ASLF argued in support of a more liberal interpretation
of EPCRA's citizen suit provision.21 6 Its appeal focused on the
contention that the Gwaltney, Ltd. analysis was inapplicable because
EPCRA's language is distinguishable from that of the Clean Water
Act.21 7 Based on the district court decisions which had held
accordingly, ASLF had legitimate authority in support of this
position.2"' ASLF argued, as several other courts had already
concluded, that EPCRA's authorization of citizen suits "for [the]
failure to do" could be interpreted differently than the Clean Water
Act's provision
permitting such suits where a party was alleged "to be
219
in violation.,
The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, labeling it "a rather
hypertechnical parsing of the language of the statute. '22 0 The court
concluded instead that Congress intended for citizen suits under
" ' Like in Gwaltney,
EPCRA to be limited to continuing violations.22
Ltd., this reasoning was based on EPCRA's sixty-day notice
provision, which would be 'rendered superfluous' if citizen suits were
Musical in its response brief on appeal. See id. at 474-75.
215. See id. at 475.
216. See id. at 476-77. Although ASLF did address the historical violations issue in
its reply brief to the Sixth Circuit, the court noted that the brief fell seven pages short of
its permissible length and stated that it was not persuaded by ASLF's contention that
space constraints prevented "full briefing" of the issue. See id. at 475 n.3. Whether this
had any effect on the court's determination of the issue is not clear.
217. See id. at 476.
218. See Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 813 F. Supp.
1132 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Williams v. Leybold Technologies, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 765 (N.D.
Cal. 1992); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg., 772 F.
Supp. 745 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); see also supra Part III.A.1.
219. See United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 476.
220. Id. at 477. In labeling the argument "hypertechnical parsing," the Sixth Circuit
was responding to a finding by the district court in Whiting Roll-Up Door
Manufacturing, Corp. that "[tlhe natural reading of the EPCRA provision at least would
seem to include past acts of non-compliance, while a natural reading of the Clean Water
Act provision, as the Supreme Court has held, indicates that the statute contemplates
only prospective relief." Id. at 476-77 (quoting Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg., 772 F.
Supp. at 752). The court apparently concluded that slight differences in the way
Congress phrased EPCRA's citizen suit provision were inconclusive at best. See id.
(quoting the Supreme Court's statement in Gwaltney, Ltd. that "[c]ongress could have
phrased its requirements in language that looked to the past. . . ,but did not choose this
readily available option." Gwaltney, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49,
57 (1987)).
221. See United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 477.
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permitted for historical violations. 222 The court also rejected ASLF's
argument that subsequent action by Congress had undercut the
persuasiveness of the Gwaltney, Ltd. holding.2 3 ASLF asserted that
congressional amendments to the Clean Air Act 2 24 made after
Gwaltney, Ltd., explicitly permitting such suits for past violations,
suggested that Congress intended a result different from what
Gwaltney, Ltd. held.2 ' This argument, however, failed to persuade
the court, which elected to follow Gwaltney, Ltd. in the absence of
"explicit congressional language mandating" to the contrary.26
Further, like the Gwaltney, Ltd. Court, the Sixth Circuit discerned
that citizen suits were meant to play only a supplementary role in
EPCRA's enforcement. 227 The presence of section 326(e), which
prohibits citizen remedies in cases where the EPA has commenced an
enforcement action, persuaded the court that "Congress envisioned
citizen suits as primarily a means to enforce EPCRA when a violation
continues because the EPA has failed to enforce the Act." 228 The court
reasoned that EPCRA's scheme left discretion wholly with the EPA to
determine which violators should be pursued. 9
In addition, according to the Sixth Circuit, EPCRA's citizen suit
provision emphasizes completion and submission of the forms rather
than the timeliness of their submission.23 The court reasoned that
once the forms containing the required information are filed, EPCRA's
222. See id. The court's decision to apply Gwaltney, Ltd. was based on EPCRA's
sixty-day notice provision, which mirrored its counterpart in the Clean Water Act. See
supra notes 204-06. The court stated, "[aillowing citizen suits for past violations would
render superfluous EPCRA's requirement of sixty-days notice to the alleged violator."
United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 477.
223. See id.
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This provision now
authorizes citizen suits against any person "who is alleged to have violated (if there is
evidence that the alleged violation has been repeated) or to be in violation of" the act's
requirements. Id.
225. See United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 477; see also infra notes 267-72 and
accompanying text.
226. Id. at 477 (noting that it could be argued with equal force that, by failing also to
amend EPCRA, Congress intended that citizen suits be limited under that statute).
227. See id. See also supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
228. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 477.
229. See id. The court stated, "[allthough civil penalties for purely historical
violations may be appropriate in some cases, the congressional scheme leaves to the
EPA, with its broad perspective on the entire spectrum of enforcement and compliance,
discretion to determine those violators whose conduct warrants such penalties." Id.
230. See id. at 475. Section 326(a)(1)(A)(iv) of EPCRA authorizes citizen civil
actions for the failure to "complete and submit a toxic chemical release form [Form RI
under section 11023(a) .... EPCRA § 326(a)(1)(A)(iv), 42 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(iv)
(1994).
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purpose is achieved and citizen enforcement becomes unnecessary. 3
The court added, "[w]e see no basis upon which one must conclude
that Congress, when contemplating citizen enforcement suits, intended
such a late submission to32 be the equivalent of a complete failure to
' '2
submit the information.
Thus, it was primarily on the basis of EPCRA's structure and
language that the Sixth Circuit determined that civil penalties for purely
historical reporting violations may not be sought by citizen plaintiffs
under EPCRA.2 33 In reaching this determination, the Sixth Circuit
essentially reiterated the Supreme Court's rationale in Gwaltney, Ltd.
regarding the Clean Water Act to EPCRA.234 The court concluded that
Congress intentionally limited citizen suits by subordinating them to
suits brought by the EPA, or other governmental bodies. 5
3. Citizensfor a Better Environment: The Seventh Circuit's View of
Citizen Suits Under EPCRA
Even though United Musical Instruments had created a precedent for
appellate review of the scope of citizen suits under EPCRA, the
236
Seventh Circuit in Citizens for a Better Environment v. Steel Co.
elected to follow a different line of reasoning, giving rise to the current
conflict between circuits which this Comment addresses.237 In
Citizens for a Better Environment, the Seventh Circuit rejected the
Gwaltney, Ltd. analogy employed by the court in United Musical
Instruments, electing to adopt the district court holdings 238 that had
permitted civil remedies despite the fact that the alleged non23 1. See United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 477.
232. Id. at 475.
233. See id. at 478. Although it was presented with an issue of first impression, the
court essentially reiterated the Supreme Court's reasoning in Gwaltney, Ltd. concerning
the Clean Water Act and applied that reasoning to EPCRA. See id. at 475-78. The court
undertook only a cursory examination of EPCRA's provisions and never actually took
into consideration the Act's goals and objectives. See id. As a result, its analysis was
dominantly confined to the Act's language and structure: "In sum, the plain language
and structure of EPCRA lead us to conclude that citizen plaintiffs may not bring actions
that seek civil penalties for purely historical violations." Id. at 478.
234. See id. at 477.
235. See id. at 478.
236. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1243 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 1079 (Feb. 24, 1997).
237. See generally supra Part I.
238. See Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 813 F. Supp.
1132 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Williams v. Leybold Technologies, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 765 (N.D.
Cal. 1992); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg., 772 F.
Supp. 745 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); see also supra Part II.A.1 (discussing more fully these
district court cases).
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compliance had been cured by the time a citizen suit was filed. 239
In March of 1995, a not-for-profit organization called Citizens for a
Better Environment ("Citizens") notified a Chicago steel manufacturer,
the Illinois EPA, and other authorities of its intent to sue the steel
manufacturer over multiple violations of EPCRA's reporting
requirements. 24 Citizens had uncovered what amounted to more than
70,000 possible EPCRA violations by The Steel Company ("Steel
Company"), a regular user of toxic chemicals that had not submitted a
single inventory or toxic release form since EPCRA's enactment in
1986.21 Upon notification of Citizens' intent to sue, Steel Company
filed numerous overdue forms with various designated agencies,
thereby bringing itself into compliance with EPCRA's reporting
requirements.242 However, despite the extent of Steel Company's
alleged non-compliance, no proceedings of any kind, enforcement or
otherwise, were initiated by the EPA within the sixty-day notice
period.243 Citizens, therefore, filed a complaint in the district court on
August 7, 1995.24
Persuaded by the precedent set in United Musical Instruments, the
district court adopted the rationale employed by the Sixth Circuit and
dismissed Citizens' suit for lack of jurisdiction because Steel
Company's overdue filing had rendered the alleged violations purely
historical. 245 Relying almost exclusively on United Musical
Instruments, the district court held that because the required forms had
been completed and submitted by the time Citizens' complaint was
filed, the non-compliance had been cured rendering Citizens' suit
unauthorized by the Act.'
Whereas the district court chose to apply the Sixth Circuit's holding,
the Seventh Circuit on appeal reached a different legal conclusion.2 47
The court resisted the Sixth Circuit's application of Gwaltney, Ltd. 's
239. See id.; see also supra notes 182-201 and accompanying text.
240. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1241.
241. See id. at 1241.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See Citizens For a Better Env't v. Steel Co., No. 95 C 4534, 1995 WL 758122
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 1995) (granting Steel Co.'s motion to dismiss).
246. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1242 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (Feb. 24, 1997). On appeal, however, the Seventh
Circuit noted that "[tihis reliance was not misplaced ... [as United Musical Instruments]
. . . is also the only appellate court decision addressing the central question of this
case." Id.
247. See supra note 215 and accompanying text; Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d
at 1242, 1245.
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holding to the EPCRA provisions, choosing instead to apply only its
"interpretive methodology." 248 Unlike the United Musical Instruments
court, the Seventh Circuit deemed it more significant that every other
district court which examined the issue had distinguished it from
Gwaltney, Ltd.'s reading of the Clean Water Act. 249 Although it
acknowledged that United Musical Instruments was virtually
indistinguishable factually from the case before it, the Seventh Circuit
still found that EPCRA's citizen suit provision is not limited to ongoing or continuing violations.'
Beginning with an analysis of the statutory language, the Seventh
Circuit court undertook its own syntactical analysis of EPCRA's
enforcement provisions, closely scrutinizing the Sixth Circuit's prior
analysis. 25 ' First, the Citizens for a Better Environment court
reasoned that the "failure to do" something could refer to a failure in
the past or in the present2 2 Thus, it concluded that EPCRA's section
326 grant of private enforcement authority incorporated no temporal
limitation. 3 Second, the Citizens for a Better Environment court,
unlike the Sixth Circuit, recognized that the essential element of
timeliness must also be considered in determining compliance with the
requirements of the Act. 254 The Seventh Circuit interpreted EPCRA's
citizen suit provision to "authoriz[e] citizen suits not only for failure to
complete and submit forms, but for failure to complete and submit
forms in accordance with the requirements set forth in the referenced
'
The court determined that Congress intended to
sections." 255
incorporate the required elements of the Act's reporting requirements
without having to engage in a duplicative listing of the timing elements
of another section. 25 6 Timely compliance is one of EPCRA's
important elements, according to the court,257 and therefore, the
statute's compliance dates should likewise be included in any analysis
248. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1242, 1245.
249. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1242. This meant that the court
would examine EPCRA using the same criteria as that set forth by the Supreme Court in
Gwaltney, Ltd., but without necessarily adopting its holding. See id.
250. See id. at 1243.
251. See id. at 1243-44.
252. See id. at 1243. See also EPCRA § 326, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1994).
253. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1243.
254. See id.
255. Id.
256. See id. (noting the compliance date requirements of EPCRA §§ 312-313).
257. See id. The court cited EPCRA's legislative history which makes clear
Congress' goal to provide "essential" information to the public in a timely fashion. See
id. at 1243 n.2.
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of its citizen enforcement provisions.'
Continuing to follow Gwaltney, Ltd.'s "interpretive methodology,"
the Citizens for a Better Environment court turned next to an
examination of EPCRA's language as a whole.259 Unlike the Clean
Water Act's citizen suit language, which might be viewed as
undeviating from the present tense,26 the court deemed it significant
that EPCRA's language is "not likewise cast in the present tense., 261
To illustrate, the court cited language from EPCRA's citizen suit
provision which is, in fact, cast in the past tense, referring to EPCRA
section 326(b)(1). 62 According to the court, EPCRA's varying
language is neutral enough to indicate either a forward-looking or a
backward-looking application. 2' The Seventh Circuit interpreted its
more neutral language as a suggestion that Congress intended
EPCRA's provision to differ from the present tense language used in
the Clean Water Act.2' The absence of explicit restrictions on private
suits coupled with language specifically referring to past violations
persuaded the Citizens for a Better Environment court that Congress
intended no such limitation under EPCRA.265 Therefore, after
examining the language in its entirety (as the Gwaltney, Ltd. Court had
done), the Seventh Circuit determined that EPCRA permits a cause of
action even for violations that have been cured by the time the citizen
plaintiff's suit is filed. 2
In addition to language, the Seventh Circuit looked to Congressional
intent as an indicator of the scope of authority to be afforded citizen
suits under EPCRA.2 67 Like the court in United Musical Instruments,
258. See id. at 1243. See also 132 CONG. REC. H9593 (Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of
Rep. Sikorski).
259. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1243.
260. See id. at 1244 (citing Gwaltney, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S.
49, 59 (1987)).
261. Id. at 1244. Like the Gwaltney, Ltd. Court, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that
Congress knew precisely how to require allegations of an on-going violation when it
intended to do so. See id. See also Gwaltney, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 58-59.
262. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1244. See also EPCRA § 326, 42
U.S.C. 11046(b)(1) (1994), which provides that citizen suits "shall be brought in the
district court in which the alleged violation occurred." Id.
263. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1244. The court pointed out that
"[njowhere does EPCRA contain the 'is occurring' language of the [Clean Water Act] to
indicate that citizens must allege an on-going violation." Id.
264. See id. at 1244.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 1243 n.2 (citing Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works, Superfund Improvement Act of 1985, S. REP. No. 99-11, at 14-15 (1985)
(noting that the goal of EPCRA is to make essential information widely available and in
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the Citizensfor a Better Environment court took into consideration the
amendments made by Congress to the language of the Clean Air Act,
expressly permitting citizens civil remedies for repeated historical
violations.26 In Gwaltney, Ltd., the Supreme Court relied on the
premise that the Clean Water Act's sixty-day notice provision is
irreconcilable with permitting citizen suits for past violations. 269 In
concluding that the statute's notice provision intends to permit
violators the opportunity to bring themselves into compliance, the
Supreme Court reasoned that the EPA's enforcement authority would,
therefore, be encroached upon should citizens be allowed to bring suit
after violations had been cured. 270 Although this premise may have
been validated by later decisions under the Clean Water Act, 27' the
Seventh Circuit viewed the reasoning as outdated and inapplicable to
EPCRA, especially considering the subsequent amendments made by
Congress to the Clean Air Act.272

The Seventh Circuit's examination of congressional action in the
context of EPCRA's disparate language enabled it to interpret the
legislature's intent differently than the United Musical Instruments
court, and therefore, reach a different understanding of EPCRA's
notice provision. 273 It recognized that permitting citizen suits even
where a violator has cured its past compliance would not inhibit the
Act's notice provision.274 The purpose served by notice was to
mitigate non-compliance, because each day of violation by a facility
carries additional penalties. 275 Notice also preserves the EPA's
discretionary enforcement power by giving the agency the first and
foremost opportunity to respond. 276 Thus, the court reasoned that
leaving the notice provision as it was conveyed an intent that EPCRA's
notice provision serve a different function than its counterparts in other
environmental statutes. 277
a timely fashion)).
268. See id. at 1244; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (1994).
269. See Gwaltney, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 59-60.
270. See id. at 60.; see also supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
271. See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 809 F. Supp. 1040
(W.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1994).
272. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1244. "This line of reasoning is no
longer as compelling as it was when Gwaltney was decided." Id.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id. "[Nlotice gives the violator the opportunity to limit exposure by filing
late reports." Id.
276. See also EPCRA §§ 325, 326(d)(1)-(2), (e), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11045, 11046(d)(l)(2), (e) (1994).
277. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1244.
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In addition to support from language and intent, the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Citizens for a Better Environment looked past
EPCRA's specific provisions and guidelines, and assessed the
practical meaning and effect of the Act as a whole.278 Most
significantly, the Citizens for a Better Environment court concluded
that a proper interpretation of EPCRA's citizen enforcement provisions
must be reconciled with the objectives and purpose underlying
EPCRA's reporting requirements. 279 EPCRA creates a structure of
"incentives" for private citizens to assist with the investigation and
enforcement of its reporting requirements, incurring substantial costs
in the process. 278 Recognizing the need for such incentives, the court
paid close attention to the protection of these "incentives:"
EPCRA creates a structure that encourages private citizens to
invest the resources necessary to uncover violations of the Act
by allowing courts to award the costs of enforcement to
prevailing or substantially prevailing parties .... If citizen suits
could be fully prevented by 'completing and submitting' forms,
however late, citizens would have no real incentive to incur the
costs of learning about EPCRA, investigating suspected violators,
and analyzing information. Put simply, if citizens can't sue,
they can't recover the costs of their efforts.281
According to the Seventh Circuit, the scenario engendered by such an
interpretation of EPCRA citizen enforcement would be contrary to
Congressional intent. 2 2 Because the primary incentive for citizen
enforcement activity lies in the ability to recover such costs through
private litigation, the court concluded that such incentives would be
undermined by a decision that restricted citizen actions to continuing
violations. 2"
B. Supreme Court Review
On February 24, 1997, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the Seventh Circuit's decision in Citizens for a Better
Environment.2 While the Sixth and Seventh Circuits remain the only
two appeals courts to have decided the legality of citizen suits for
278. See id. at 1244-45.
279. See id.
280. See generally Lehner, supra note 136, at 6-8.
281. Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1244.
282. See id. at 1245 (explaining that such a scenario "is impossible to reconcile with
the clearly expressed intent of Congress, or with the very existence of the citizen
enforcement provision").
283. See id. at 1244-45.
284. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 117 S. CL 1079 (Feb. 24, 1997).
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historical violations under EPCRA, the Supreme Court's grant of
certiorari acknowledges and attests to the significance of the existing
debate and its impact on EPCRA's immense regulatory program. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, the United States has submitted an
amicus brief on behalf of Citizens as respondent to allow citizen suits
under EPCRA for historical violations.28
In addition, subsequent district court decisions have also
unanimously adopted the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Citizens
for a Better Environment.286 In Don't Waste Arizona, Inc.,287 for
example, the court squarely rejected the Gwaltney, Ltd. rationale
(adopted by the Sixth Circuit) in favor of the Citizens for a Better
Environment court's interpretation of citizen suits under EPCRA. 28
The court concluded that the Seventh Circuit's conclusion "embraced
the better reasoned approach to statutory construction."'
The court
also took issue with the Sixth Circuit's application of the Gwaltney,
Ltd. holding to EPCRA stating, "the Gwaltney Court's conclusion,
heavily relied upon by the [United Musical Instruments] court, is at
least questionable in light of Congress' 1990 amendments to the Clean
Air Act., 290 The Don't Waste Arizona, Inc. court concluded that
Congress did not likewise amend the citizen suit provision of EPCRA
because its language already permitted such suits for historical
violations.29 '
IV. ANALYSIS
Ten years after EPCRA's enactment in 1986, the Seventh Circuit
has rejuvenated EPCRA's citizen suit provision with its holding in
Citizens for a Better Environment. The Citizens for a Better
Environment opinion reflects a conscious effort by the court to
examine EPCRA's enforcement provisions as a whole, not only in the
context of the case before it, but with an eye toward the Act's purpose,

285. See Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, 1997 WL
218638 (No. 96-643) (May 7, 1997).
286. See Neighbors for a Toxic Free Community v. Vulcan Materials, 964 F. Supp.
1448 (D. Colo. 1997); Don't Waste Arizona, Inc. v. McLane Foods, Inc., 950 F. Supp.
972 (D. Ariz. Jan. 8, 1997); Idaho Sporting Congress v. Computrol, Inc., 952 F. Supp.
690 (D. Idaho Dec. 17, 1996). See also supra note 118.
287. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
288. See Don't Waste Arizona, Inc., 950 F. Supp. at 976.
289. Id. The court explained that "[a]nalysis of the plain language of the statute and
the policies driving the enactment of EPCRA compels thfis] conclusion." Id.
290. Id. See also supra notes 220- 23 and accompanying text.
29 1. See Don't Waste Arizona, Inc., 950 F. Supp. at 976.
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goals, and practical application. 2" From a practical standpoint, the
Citizens for a Better Environment court, along with other courts,
found that EPCRA's objectives are better served by a liberal reading of
its citizen suit provision.293 These courts have concluded that the
failure to submit accurate and timely reports under EPCRA constitutes
a violation, whether subsequently remedied or not, that should be
subject to the enforcement authority of private citizens.'
A. InterpretingEPCRA's Language
Although EPCRA's provisions dividing enforcement among various
groups contain discrepancies in language, the Seventh Circuit was
correct to note that the differences indicate only an attempt at
brevity.2 95 In contrast to its grant of authority to private citizens,
EPCRA authorizes the EPA to take action against "any person...
who violates any requirement" of EPCRA and to pursue "any civil
penalty for which a person is liable." 2"
The Sixth Circuit viewed the distinctions in language between
EPCRA's citizen enforcement provision and its EPA enforcement
provision as determinative-an indicator that Congress intended for
citizen suits to be limited to on-going violations.297 Ironically, in
doing so, it engaged in its own form of "hypertechnical parsing" 2' by
pointing cut such syntactical differences in the grants of authority to

292. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1238 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 1079 (Feb. 24, 1997) (noting that "some discussion of
the Act's history and goals may therefore be in order to put this case in context").
293. See id. at 1244-45.
294. See Don't Waste Arizona, Inc., 950 F. Supp. at 979 (discussing policy reasons
why timely reporting is an essential element of EPCRA reporting).
295. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1242. While the United Musical
Instruments court's interpretation neglected to account for such incorporations of other
EPCRA sections, the Seventh Circuit recognized that "the most natural reading of the use
of 'under' is 'in accordance with the requirements of that section."' Id.
296. See EPCRA § 325(c)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § I 1045(c)(1)-(4) (1994).
297. See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc.,
61 F.3d 473, 475 (6th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied en banc, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 30933
(6th Cir. Oct. 16, 1995). According to the Sixth Circuit:
This language suggests that only the failure to complete and submit the
required forms can provide the basis for a citizen suit. While among the
provisions of [§ 313(a)] is the requirement that the form be filed by July 1 for
the preceding calendar year, the citizen suit provision speaks only of the
completion and filing of the form. The form is completed and filed even when
it is not timely filed.
Id.
298. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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citizen plaintiffs and the EPA.2 9 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit also
reasoned that because EPCRA's citizen suit provision fails to repeat
the compliance date requirements set forth in its 'right-to-know'
reporting provisions, 3° the issue of timeliness could provide no basis
for citizen suit authority.3"' However, one need only observe the
citizen suit provision's explicit reference to such other sections to
realize that a facility's late submission of the forms would constitute "a
failure" to satisfy the requirements of that section; timeliness is an
essential element of compliance with the reporting requirements.?
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit and other courts have properly
recognized that EPCRA's use of the word "under" constitutes a
method of incorporating the elements of respective sections of the Act
into its citizen suit provision. 33° Each referenced section commands a
specific deadline for which compliance is mandatory. 304 The Citizens
for a Better Environment opinion emphasized that EPCRA's
compliance dates "are not guidelines or suggestions; they are essential
elements of provisions citizens have authority to enforce., 3 5 In
drafting EPCRA's provisions, Congress likewise emphasized that
speed and accuracy would be essential elements of EPCRA's
requirements and necessary to achieve its goals of public safety.3 6

299. See United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 475.
300. See, e.g., EPCRA § 313(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1994).
301. See United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 475. The court reasoned that "[i]f
Congress had intended to authorize citizen suits for any violation .
-such as a late
submission-it could easily have done so." id.
302. See EPCRA § 326(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (a)(1)(A) (1994) (listing, by
reference only to various sections of the Act, the types of violations for which a citizen
suit can be brought).
303. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1243 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (Feb. 24, 1997); Don't Waste Arizona, Inc. v.
McLane Foods, Inc., 950 F. Supp. at 978; Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Whiting
Roll-Up Door Mfg., 772 F. Supp. 745, 750 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
304. See, e.g., EPCRA § 312, 42 U.S.C. § 11022 (1994) (requiring annual
submissions by March 1 of each year); EPCRA § 313, 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (requiring
Form R submissions by July 1 of each year).
305. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1243.
306. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 111 (1985) (emphasizing that "once
the material safety data sheets are developed, it is crucial that they be made available to
the public in the quickest, most efficient way possible"); 132 CONG. REC. H29747 (Oct.
8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Sikorski) (stating that "[d]isclosure of hazardous waste
emissions ... must be swift and complete. The requirements for disclosure ... must be
strictly and strenuously enforced").
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B. Interpreting EPCRA's Legislative History.andIntent
EPCRA reporting plays an integral role in the Act's objective of
providing timely and accurate information about the presence of toxic
and hazardous chemicals to concerned citizens.l3 In the preamble to
EPCRA's legislative conference report, Congress expressly sets forth
the dual purpose behind EPCRA's enactment. 3 1 Congress' intent to
establish information awareness and availability regarding hazardous
chemicals is promoted through its "right-to-know" reporting
provisions, 1 9 while its intent to develop emergency response plans
and procedures are promoted through the Act's mandatory release
notification requirements.31°
Although nowhere within EPCRA is there an expressed objective of
pollution reduction, the impetus for such a goal is provided simply by
requiring facility owners and operators to account for and become
precisely aware of what they are handling, using, and releasing into
the environment. 31' In declining to implement new controls on the use
or release of toxic chemicals, Congress anticipated that the increased
availability of information on such chemicals would enable public
involvement toward that same end.312

307. See Shavelson, supra note 26, at 32.
308. See House Conference Report, supra note 3, at 281. The report states: "The
Senate Amendment and House amendment both establish programs to provide the public
with important information on the hazardous chemicals in their communities, and to
establish emergency planning and notification requirements which would protect the
public in the event of a release of hazardous chemicals." Id.
309. See supra Part II.A.2.
310. See supra Part II.A.2; see also Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg., 772 F. Supp. at 751
(stating that "Congress designed the concept of the emergency response plan, which
necessarily depends on accurate and current information, as a public safety measure in
case of a hazardous chemical release"); Abell, supra note 27, at 584 (stating that "[tihe
local comprehensive emergency plan is essential to a community's effective response to
a serious toxic release . . . . [Cihemical information provided by a community's
manufacturing facilities allows for [the accurate] assessment of hazards and the
[effective] coordination of police, fire, government and health officials in anticipation
of future toxic emergencies").
311. See EPCRA § 313, 42 U.S.C. § 11023(h) (1994). Congress intended EPCRA's
toxic release reporting "to inform persons about releases of toxic chemicals to the
environment; to assist governmental agencies, researchers, and other persons in the
conduct of research and data gathering; to aid in the development of appropriate
regulations, guidelines, and standards; and for other similar purposes." Id.
3 12. See PERCIVAL Er AL, supra note 5, at 647, 649.
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C. Effectiveness of EPCRA and the TRI
To date, EPCRA appears to be very effective, with many viewing
the Act as a dramatic success.3 13 Information obtained through
EPCRA has impacted public policy decisions and played a key role in
the formation of federal and state environmental programs.314 At least
two commentators have predicted as a "virtual certainty" that such uses
of EPCRA data will continue well into the future.31 5 Reports issued
by the EPA following EPCRA's enactment have indicated an increase
in the public's environmental awareness and concern about the use of
toxic chemicals.316 Such an enhanced awareness will likely lead to
new and improved uses of EPCRA information as well as further
expansion of right-to-know legislation.1 7
Although its goals and potential benefits are commendable,
commentators have noted that EPCRA is not without its problems.31 8
However, EPCRA has demonstrated so far that it possesses the
capability of realizing benefits well beyond its intended objectives.319
EPCRA's public reporting requirements have forced manufacturers
and other industries to confront the economic
and environmental
320
significance of their use of toxic chemicals:
3 13. See id. at 652.
314. See Abell, supra note 27, at 602 (citing the Pollution Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 13101-13109 (1994)); see also Christiansen and Urquhart, supra note 37, at 259
(referencing the hazardous air pollutant provisions of the Clean Air Act). Other federal
programs using TRI data to establish priority criteria include the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42
U.S.C. § 9659 (1994) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994). See also U.S. EPA, Office of Toxic Substances,
Toxics IN THE COMMUNITY NATIONAL AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES: THE 1989 Toxics RELEASE
INVENTORY REPORT 5-8 (1991) (discussing role of the TRI in the Pollution Prevention
Act of 1990).
3 15. See Christiansen and Urquhart, supra note 37, at 259.
3 16. See, e.g., Abell, supra note 27, at 586 (predicting that data obtained from
EPCRA reporting assists in calculating toxic exposure levels, evaluating and
developing existing or new regulatory approaches, illuminating particular
environmental hazards, and promoting strategies for pollution prevention).
3 17. See Christiansen and Urquhart, supra note 37, at 259.
3 18. See Abell, supra note 27, at 586. Abell adds that "the quality of the data
received by the EPA, the lack of health and environmental risk information, and
inadequate Agency enforcement all cripple the TRI." Id. at 588. In addition, EPCRA
facilities have been faced with difficulties in determining whether they are subject to
EPCRA's reporting requirements due to the constant "state of flux" of the EPA's lists of
"hazardous" or "extremely hazardous" chemicals. Id. at 584.
319. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1238 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (Feb. 24, 1997) (referring to a reduction in toxic
chemicals releases of nearly 43% since 1988).
320. See Abell, supra note 27, at 589. Abell adds, "[tihis is the underlying
philosophy of EPCRA." Id.
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First, quantifying releases helps companies identify processes
that can be made more environmentally efficient. Second, toxic
waste reductions often result in lower production costs. Finally,
reporting toxic releases to the public encourages firms to
become more efficient in the face of public scrutiny.32

Therefore, as a result of EPCRA and the TRI, many companies
have initiated voluntary programs aimed at toxic reduction.322
Consequently, for each of the first four years that TRI reports were
collected by the EPA, the total number of reported toxic emissions
decreased.323 For these reasons, the TRI has been labeled as an
innovative environmental regulatory device. 324 Not only does the TRI
collect and compile an extraordinary amount of information considered
valuable by citizens, industry, and the government alike, but also it is
able to sort this information in ways that are revolutionary. 325
D. The Importance of Citizen Enforcement of EPCRA
EPCRA has affected industry behavior through information
disclosure rather than expensive command-and-control legislation.326
Because EPCRA does not regulate by command-and-control, its
success hinges largely on the extent to which the general public uses
the information obtained on the use of toxic and hazardous
chemicals.327 Neither EPCRA nor its enforcers can directly reduce or
limit the amounts of hazardous chemicals being used or emitted into
321. Id.
322. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 5, at 650. For example, through EPCRA
reporting, the Monsanto Corporation discovered that its 35 plants had released over 374
million pounds of toxic substances. See id. It vowed to reduce its toxic chemical
emissions by 90% by the end of 1992. See id. By 1991, Monsanto had managed to
reduce these omissions by a staggering 74%. See Abell, supra note 27, at 589. Abell
notes that Monsanto Corporation's voluntary decrease of its toxic emissions,
"represents the classic response intended by the drafters of EPCRA." Id.
323. See Bass & McLean, supra note 85, at 299.
324. See, e.g., Abell, supra note 27, at 588. By providing information on pollution
problems in the aggregate, "[t]he TRI represents an innovation when considering the
traditionally fragmented and decentralized nature of the typical regulatory scheme." Id. at
606 n.60.
325. See Bass & McLean, supra note 85, at 296. The authors explain:
TRI information can be combined in a variety of ways to identify top polluters
and polluting chemicals, detect geographic patterns of pollution, or analyze
pollution coming into an incinerator, landfill, or sewer. The importance of
TRI is hard to overestimate. Indeed its value has already been demonstrated
repeatedly in influencing industry behavior, public policies, and public
education.
Id.
326. See Shavelson, supra note 26, at 30.
327. See PERCIVAL El AL., supra note 5, at 653.
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the environment; EPCRA only provides a means of knowledge around
which lobbying efforts can be sustained.
The power of citizens to sue under EPCRA, therefore, can only
effect indirectly the amount of toxic and hazardous chemicals being
emitted.3" However, supporters of citizen suits, in general, argue that
such provisions enable more thorough and equitable enforcement of
environmental regulations, while at the same time, enhancing public
participation in environmental decision-making. 329 Through the citizen
suit provision, citizens are permitted to combat pollution and
environmental degradation through cheaper and more enhanced means
of enforcing environmental laws and regulations. 330 The Citizensfor a
Better Environment court noted the pertinent benefits that EPCRA's
reporting requirements provide in the way of enhancing safety and
welfare to the general public. 33' In addition, it addressed the potential
ramifications if judicial determinations further erode the effectiveness
of citizen enforcement. 332 The court reasoned:
the interpretation adopted by the Sixth Circuit ... would largely

shift the cost of EPCRA compliance from regulated industrial
users to private citizens. Private citizens would have to absorb
much of the cost of monitoring chemical use and keeping up to
date on changes in EPCRA requirements, with little or no hope
of recovering these costs through awards of litigation
expenses.333
The Citizens for a Better Environment court also recognized that
granting full enforcement authority to private citizens under EPCRA
might actually decrease the amount of litigation over EPCRA's
328. See Bass & McLean, supra note 85, at 296.
329. See Lehner, supra note 136, at 4.
330. See supra Part II.A.3.
331. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1238-39 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (Feb. 24, 1997) (noting that EPCRA information
"has also been put to some creative uses and led to some unexpected results .... Some
observers have found 'reason to believe that the public release of information about
discharge of toxic chemicals has by itself spurred competition to reduce releases, quite
independently of government regulation"' (quoting Richard H. Pildes & Cass R.
Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995))); see also
Lehner, supra note 136, at 7. Lehner notes that:
from the environmental perspective, additional enforcement leading to fewer
violations of environmental laws means a cleaner environment ....
Overall,
the cumulative impact of these cases is a clear signal to would-be violators:
comply or be sued. This leads to greater deterrence and a higher general level
of compliance.
Id. at 7.
332. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1244-45.
333. Id.
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reporting requirements.334 According to the court, the likelihood of
settlement increases when citizens are granted full enforcement
authority under EPCRA.335 The Seventh Circuit concluded that a
violator of EPCRA is much less likely to persist in non-compliance
where citizen enforcement acts as an effective supplement to EPA
action. 336
V.

A.

PROPOSAL

EPCRA's Citizen Suit ProvisionsMust Have Muscle

For private enforcement to be effective as a supplement to EPCRA's
other enforcement mechanisms, private citizens must be empowered to
sue for historical and ongoing violations alike. Properly viewed,
Congress' intent in drafting EPCRA's enforcement provisions was to
provide a variety of enforcement measures in order to enhance
compliance.3 3 7 Citizen suits enable the public to participate in the

enforcement of EPCRA's requirements, which are designed to protect
the public and ensure public participation in achieving its goals.3 38
EPCRA's citizen suit provision furthers that purpose by providing

private citizens with both the "right-to-know" and the "power to act."
Although the reasoning employed by the courts in Gwaltney, Ltd.
and United Musical Instruments is logical, the Seventh Circuit is

correct in recognizing the inherent practical difficulties in such a
limiting interpretation of citizen suits.3 39 A prospective limitation on
citizen suit authority would only operate as a disincentive to industry
compliance because such industries would realize that private

enforcement was not really a threat.340 A more literal reading of
334. See id. at 1244. Reconciling the court's liberal view of citizen suits with
EPCRA's notice provision, the court pointed out that, among other benefits, notice can
actually conserve resources by giving violators the opportunity to limit their exposure
to damages and the incentive to enter into settlement negotiations to avoid the
potentially higher costs of litigation. See id.
335. See id.
336. See id.
337 See id. at 1240; see also supra Part II.A.3 (discussing Citizens for a Better Env't
more fully).
338. See supra Part IV.D.
339. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1244-45.
340. See generally Lehner, supra note 136, at 7. Lehner comments that:
A lenient pattern of enforcement tends to encourage companies to be lax in
their compliance. When enforcement is weak, the cost to the company of
complying with the law is worth less than taking a chance at not being
caught. Therefore, many companies will choose a course of noncompliance
rather than conducting business in a manner in which acceptable standards
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EPCRA would add credibility to the provision's language, making
compliance an industry imperative in the face of enforcement from
both EPA and the general public. The latter interpretation seems more
logical and practical in light of EPCRA's original rationale and stated
purpose-to insulate the general public from toxics and other
hazardous chemicals. 341
EPCRA's enforcement and penalty provisions attempt to deter noncompliance by ensuring that proper reporting is always in a facility's
best interest.3 42 Allowing citizen civil actions against historical
violators can further this objective of deterrence. The threat of liability
for past violations makes non-compliant conduct irrational by exposing
a violating facility through accountability to the general public. While
violators are at all times accountable to state and administrative
authorities, the incentives of political and financial influence over these
authorities disappear where exposed to public scrutiny. Permitting
citizens to sue for reporting violations, whenever they occur,
eliminates the cost-benefit analysis a facility might be inclined to
undertake in the absence of such citizen suits.
A proper reading of EPCRA's citizen suit provision, and any other
similar environmental statute, must also take the Act's practical
application and effect into consideration.343 The Seventh Circuit
properly observed EPCRA's practical effects and potential benefits
when it examined its citizen suit enforcement provision. 3 " The
opportunities and incentives for settlement negotiations are raised
where violators are faced with litigation from multiple sides.3 4 5
Likewise, citizen plaintiffs would prefer to engender compliance
through whatever vehicle, whether through its own settlement, or
through a violator's settlement with EPA authorities. Promoting
settlement frees up precious resources for the pursuit of other wouldbe violators.
would otherwise develop .... [E]ven companies which would like to comply
with the law may feel pressure to become violators in order to lower costs to
compete with other, non-complying businesses. The increased enforcement
provided by citizen suits changes these incentives ....
Id.
341. See generally House Conference Report, supra note 3 and discussed supra note
308.
342. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
343. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1244 (concluding that the specific
language of EPCRA's citizen suit provision must be interpreted in a way that gives
meaning to the entire provision as a whole).
344. See supra notes 331-33 and accompanying text.
345. See id.
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B. Public Awareness and Involvement Must Be Promoted
The prohibitive costs of litigation, especially civil litigation
involving large corporations, will prevent citizen suits under EPCRA
from ever becoming a trend. 346 These costs are felt by both EPA and
by private environmental organizations.347 Congress' ability to
recognize the need for multiple forms of enforcement is critical, given
the realities of limited resources that both federal and state agencies and
private non-profit groups face.
EPA is a government agency and, as a result, a political entity.
Although EPA's enforcement of environmental regulations takes many
forms, it only occasionally develops into civil actions against violators
for a number of reasons. First, EPA has limited resources with which
to enforce and litigate non-compliance. Second, the Agency's
objectives range well beyond the simple enforcement of the regulatory
standards to include programs and incentives aimed at pollution
prevention. Finally, political agendas and philosophies on the
environment can fluctuate within EPA just as within Congress. A
consideration of these realities helps explain the limitations behind
EPA's enforcement capabilities. Rather than place enforcement of
EPCRA's immense regulatory requirements upon one administrative
body, Congress established a variety of mechanisms for enforcement,
dispersing authority among EPA, State, and private entities.348
Considering that EPA's enforcement efforts are often financially,
resourcefully, or politically limited, this strategy was both prudent and
practical. Through supplemental enforcement, the citizen suit has and
will continue to make efficient use of such limited enforcement
resources.
Public interest organizations face similar dilemmas. Not-for-profit
groups like ASLF and Citizens serve the public by creating awareness,
representing constituencies, and voicing public opinion-services that
would otherwise be unavailable. Because of the administrative and
localized nature of most environmental legislation, direct public
representation in the enactment and enforcement processes would be
346. See Lehner, supra note 136, at 8 (noting that "the cost and difficulty to the
public of bringing such cases will generally ensure that only the most substantial and
harmful violators will be pursued"). At least one commentator has argued, however, that
citizen suits "overenforce" the law, tending to be brought based on the size of potential
penalties rather than the magnitude of environmental harm. Id. at 8-9 (citing Michael S.
Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REv. 339 (1990)).
347. See Lehner, supra note 136, at 6-8 (discussing the economic impact of citizen
suits).
348. See supra Part II.A.3.
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349

virtually non-existent.
Laws that provide for citizen enforcement provide these
organizations with a chance against the well-financed and always wellrepresented interests of industry. Such provisions allow organizations
like Citizens and ASLF to recoup the costs of their monitoring and
enforcement efforts.350 While perhaps advancing a private agenda,
environmental groups generally must promote the views of the
individuals supporting their operation. Because of the scarcity of
funds, these organizations often must form coalitions and corral
resources, making their agenda even more representative of public
opinion. Finally, it should be emphasized that the fees and penalties
potentially collected from civil suits are paid to the United States
Treasury, not to the budgets of non-profit organizations. 35' Assuming
that these funds are utilized to advance the purposes and objectives
which necessitated regulatory measures such as EPCRA in the first
place, the process can be viewed as an effort to recycle the finite
financial resources of environmental enforcement.
VI. CONCLUSION

When the Supreme Court resumes the bench in October for the
1997-98 term, it will be faced with the task of pronouncing a rule
defining the scope of citizen enforcement authority under EPCRA.
This finding will have a tremendous effect on the success of EPCRA's
environmental regulatory program. Considering the impact of the
Supreme Court's ruling in Gwaltney, Ltd., its finding in Citizensfor a
Better Environment could similarly be applied beyond the scope of
EPCRA to other environmental statutes. Whatever the result, the
ruling will bear tremendously on industry, agencies and public interest
groups alike, as it will dictate the strength with which EPCRA's
reporting requirements are enforced.
Prior to the Seventh Circuit's reversal in Citizens for a Better
Environment, the authority for citizens' enforcement of federal
environmental laws lay in jeopardy. The influence of appellate-level
rulings like Gwaltney, Ltd. and United Musical Instruments eroded the
environmental enforcement power of private citizens and citizen suits.
These decisions precluded citizen suits for past violations no matter
what the context, and, as a result, stripped away from the general
349. See Lehner supra note 136, at 7 (discussing the value in enhanced public
involvement in administrative rulemaking).
350. See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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public the power of supplemental enforcement. But the Seventh
Circuit's ruling in Citizensfor a Better Environment appears to have
rejuvenated this power, even if only temporarily.
While it remains to be seen which of these conflicting interpretations
under EPCRA will prevail, Citizens for a Better Environment has
revitalized the threat of private civil litigation against violators of
EPCRA's reporting provisions. In light of the Act's admirable
objectives and apparent benefits, EPCRA's supplemental enforcement
provision regarding citizen suits should be given the proper leverage
with which to achieve its intended effect.
MICHAEL J. VAHEY

